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PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS AGAINST GUN SELLERS:
NEW INSIGHTS AND CHALLENGESt
Jean Macchiaroli Eggen*
John G. Culhane**
Gun violence continues unabated. Regulation of these deadly instruments is woe-
fully inadequate, and legislatures are compounding the problem by barring or
restricting access to the courts for the death and injuries that guns cause. In
short, Congress and state legislators have repeatedly acquiesced to the demands of
the gun lobby.
During the past several years, cities have struck back by filing public nuisance
claims against those gun sellers whose practices pose a risk to the public's health
and safety. After a slow start, public nuisance claims have recently gained trac-
tion in state appellate courts, which are increasingly coming to realize and respect
the core mission of public nuisance law. Such claims differ in essential ways from
private claims as they do not seek to recover for injuries caused by guns, but
rather allow municipalities to protect their citizens from the gun violence. Indeed,
such nuisance abatement is a central component of the state's police power, which
requires states and their political divisions to protect public health, safety, and
welfare. Several public nuisance claims seeking to compel gun makers and sellers
to refrain from practices that increase the already high risk of death or injury from
their products have been permitted to survive the pleading stage. This is a salu-
tary development and reflects better judicial understanding of the difference
between nuisance law and tort law. This Article lauds these developments while
undertaking a critical assessment of recent cases.
Part I provides an overview of public nuisance law and discusses some important
differences between claims brought by public entities and those brought by private
citizens. Part II goes into detail regarding the nature of the public nuisance
caused by the conduct of gun sellers. In Part III, the Authors examine some of the
recent decisions in which public nuisance claims against these gun dealers have
been allowed to survive a motion to dismiss, a previously insuperable hurdle,
while in Part IV they analyze the significance of these small victories for the future
of similar litigation. Finally in Part V, the Authors describe legislative efforts to
shield gun makers from these lawsuits and note flaws in the purported justfica-
tions for such legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 2, 2004, the United States Senate overwhelmingly de-
feated a bill that would have granted a sweeping and
unprecedented civil immunity to those who manufacture, market,
and sell guns.I In so doing, the Senate dealt the gun lobby a rare
and unexpected setback. Had the advocates of sensible gun con-
trol laws finally regained momentum?
In fact, that vote revealed the true strength of the gun lobby. In
a test vote a few days earlier, the immunity bill had seemed un-
stoppable; three-fourths of the chamber had voted for its passage,
many Democrats had sided with Republicans in supporting the
measure,3 and the bill appeared destined to become law. Its subse-
quent failure was attributable not to a last-minute shift in position
by proponents on the immunity issue, but rather to the utter in-
transigence of the gun lobby.
By varying majority votes, Senators interested in some form of
gun control had managed to attach significant amendments to the
bill-amendments that most Americans support.4 These would
have extended the ban on assault weapons and closed a loophole
that exempts gun show sales from background checks. 5 Once those
amendments were in place, however, the gun industry lobbyists
urged Senators to vote against the bill, and in keeping with the
trend of disturbing legislative acquiescence to the lobby's wishes,
the Senate complied.6 So empowered are the pro-gun forces that
1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Leaders Scuttle Gun Bill Over Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2004, at Al (reporting that the bill was defeated by a 90-8 margin).
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bill to Block Gun Lawsuits Moves Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2004, at A23.
3. Id.
4. A poll taken for the Consumer Federation of America showed that more than
three-quarters of all Americans support a strong ban on assault weapons, including a solid
majority (57%) of gun owners. Press Release, Consumer Federation of America, CFA Survey
Shows Gun Owners Support Assault weapons Ban (Feb. 23, 2004), available at http://
www.jointogether.org/gv/news/alerts/reader/0,2061,569370,00.html (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). According to a 2001 Zogby poll, 86% of
Americans and 78% of gun owners supported closing the gun-show loophole. Jennifer
Beazley, Texas Gun-Show Loophole an Invitation to Terrorists, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 30, 2001,
available at http://www.texansforgunsafety.org/articles/loophole.htm (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
5. CNN, Senate Kills Bill Protecting Gun Makers, Mar. 2, 2004, at http://
www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/03/02/senate.guns/index.html (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
6. See Editorial, Gun Lobby Orders the Senators, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 8, 2004, at A6
(opining that the "charade" in the Senate "ought to end any doubts about the enormous
clout" of the National Rifle Association, and describing how the "NRA instructed Senators
... that they should kill the entire bill" once the amendments were attached); see also
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any compromise, no matter how broadly supported or sensible, is
unacceptable.
Given the overwhelming power of the gun lobby, it is not surpris-
ing that the current firearms regulations in the United States remain
inadequate to prevent gun-related violence that kills or injures thou-
sands of people annually in this country. Notwithstanding the
sporadic ability of legislatures to control the access to and use of
firearms by persons likely to commit crimes of violence," the na-
tional record of violent gun crimes continues unabated. Both
individuals and public entities-cities, counties, and states-have
resorted to the judicial system to remedy injuries resulting from
gun violence that better gun control measures might have averted.
Plaintiffs have alleged various claims in their suits against the
gun industry including public nuisance,9 negligence,' ° product li-
ability," and deceptive trade and advertising practices. Of these,
perhaps the most criticized claim brought by public entities has
Stolberg, supra note 1, at A20 (reporting that the lead sponsor of the assault weapons ban,
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, said of the NRA, "They had the power to
turn around at least 60 votes in the Senate. That's amazing to me.").
7. In 1997, for example, more than 32,000 Americans were fatally shot in homicides,
suicides, and accidental shootings. Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Final Data for 1997, 47
NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. 19, 68 tbl. 16 (1999). See generally Thomas M. Scalea & Sharon M.
Henry, Demographics of Firearm Injury: Implications for Medical Practice, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 114 (2000) (presenting data on gun violence in the United States and analyzing the
public health costs associated with that violence).
8. Despite the attention and concern of the public and the legislators during the pe-
riod after the 1999 shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, no
significant federal legislation emerged in the aftermath of the tragedy. SeeJean Macchiaroli
Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Torts: Defining a Cause of Action for Victims in Suits Against
Gun Manufacturers, 81 N.C. L. REv. 115, 117-18 nn.1-2 (2002) [hereinafter Eggen & Cul-
hane, Gun Torts] (discussing various bills before Congress in aftermath of Columbine).
9. See, e.g., New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed June 26, 2000) (No.
402586/2000); Compl., City of Boston, (No. SUCV 1999-02590-C); Compl., City of Chicago
(No. 98-CH-15596)). The trend has been towards public nuisance and away from other
theories of recovery. For example, New York City's complaint, which originally alleged sev-
eral theories of liability and sought damages, Compl., City of New York v. B. L. Jennings,
Inc., (filed Aug. 25, 2000) (No. 00-CV-3641), has been amended to claim only public nui-
sance and seeks the remedy of abatement only. As discussed throughout this Article, public
nuisance is the theory that best suits state and municipal actions.
10. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Smith and Wesson Corp., (State Ct. of Fulton County, Ga.
filed Feb. 4, 1999) (No. 99VS0149217J) (alleging failure to act with reasonable care in gun
safety design); Morial v. Smith Wesson Corp., (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998) (No. 98-
18578).
11. See cases cited supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV 99-036-1279, 1999 WL 1241909
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999), motion to dismiss afffd, 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001); City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, 1999 WL 809838 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Oct.
7,1999).
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been the public nuisance claim." Despite this criticism, courts have
recently begun to demonstrate a willingness to allow public nui-
sance claims to run their course in the civil judicial process, asSo 14
evidenced by recent decisions.
The law of public nuisance, and nuisance law in general, has
been poorly understood by courts and has been the subject of
heated debate among legal scholars15 for more than a century.
While public nuisance doctrine originated as a remedy for non-
trespassory interferences with the public's right of way on public
land, the doctrine has evolved to encompass other kinds of injuries
resulting from interference with public health and safety.16 Under
contemporary law, public nuisance actions may be brought by the
state or a political subdivision of the state under criminal nuisance
statutes' or as civil actions, 8 depending upon the jurisdiction. The
state brings such actions in its capacity as parens patriae--literally
"father of the country"-to protect its citizens from threats to pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare. Unfortunately, the term "public
nuisance" is also used to describe a private cause of action that in-
jured private plaintiffs can bring, albeit under limited
circumstances, for the same incidents that give rise to the state's
claim for public nuisance.19 The goal in these personal suits is re-
dress in the form of damages or injunctive relief, not the
13. See, e.g., Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941, 1999 WL 1204353, at *2 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (dismissing Miami-Dade County's claims, including a public nuisance
claim, on the vague ground that they conflicted with a state law concerning the "manufac-
ture, sale, and distribution of firearms"); Winifred Weitsen Boyle, Comment, There's No
Smoking Gun: Cities Should Not Sue the Firearm Industry, 25 DAYTON L. Rv. 215, 238-39 (2000)
(confusing public nuisance with tort claim).
14. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003); City of Gary v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., 2003 Ind. LEXIS 1096 (Ind. Dec. 23, 2003). For discussion of these and other
public nuisance cases, see infra Parts III, IV.
15. E.g., HORACE WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES iii (3d ed. 1893) (referring to the law
of nuisance as a " 'wilderness' of law"); William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L.
REv. 399, 410 (1942) (referring to nuisance law as a "legal garbage can"); Warren A. Seavey,
Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REV. 984, 984 (1952) (char-
acterizing nuisance law as a "mystery" (quoting Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Co., 21
N.E.2d 507, 510 (N.Y. 1939))).
16. SeeJohn G. Culhane &Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for Public Nui-
sance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REv.
287, 292-93 (2001) [hereinafter Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance].
17. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138 (2003) (authorizing action to abate drug- or
prostitution-related public nuisances and criminal street gang activity); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 400.05 (1) (McKinney 1999) (declaring possession or use of certain weapons a nuisance).
18. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.01 (2003) (providing that any person, county, city, vil-
lage, or town may bring an action for damages or abatement of a public nuisance).
19. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS § 468 (2000) (noting that private plaintiff
suits for public nuisance require injuries distinct from those for which the public entity may
sue); infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
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protection of the public. These dual missions of public nuisance
lend more complexity to an already murky doctrine.
The right protected under public nuisance doctrine stems from
the state's police power and safeguards the public's right to be free
from interferences with public health, safety, and welfare.2 0 Where
such interferences are not prohibited by statute, the common law
has assumed a role in abating public nuisances, either through
direct injunctions or by requiring the offenders to cover the cost of
abatement. Although the power to abate. nuisances is an incident
of the state's police power, the municipalities, in the absence of22
express legislation to the contrary, implicitly have the same
power. In addition, courts recently have become more amenable
to private citizen claims for public nuisance in suits against the gun
industry. While such claims are often substitutions for more diffi-
cult negligence or strict liability claims, making their continued
recognition more problematic, the facts alleged in complaints help
to demonstrate that the public hazards created by gun violence do
indeed represent a nuisance subject to state regulations.
This Article takes the position that state and municipal public
nuisance suits against gun sellers are often an appropriate
response to the gun violence that results from the inadequate or
easily circumvented firearms control laws. We canvass the
20. Seegenerally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821B(1), (2) (a) (1979).
21. The power of the courts to abate public nuisances is inherent in the state's plenary
police power. See Garcia v. Gray, 507 E2d 539, 544 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that the "regula-
tion and abatement of nuisances is one of the basic functions of the police power.");
Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in
the United States, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 59, 103-05 (1999) (discussing the breadth of the police
power and its basis for abating nuisances).
22. See Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 653 F2d 1123, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980) (al-
lowing municipality to recover cost of abating public nuisance).
23. Some state statutes are specific to suits against the gun industry. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-184 (2002). The Georgia statute provides:
The authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearms or ammunition
manufacturer, trade association, or dealer by or on behalf of any governmental unit
... for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the law-
ful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public
shall be reserved exclusively to the state.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184(b)(2) (2002). State statutes limiting actions against the gun
industry are discussed infra, notes 272-86 and accompanying text; see also Penelas v. Arms
Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941, 1999 WL 1204353, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999), affd, 778
So.2d 1042 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) (dismissing Miami-Dade County's public nuisance and other
claims against gun industry on ground that claims conflicted with state statute governing
"manufacture, sale, and distribution of firearms").
24. SeeTown of EastTroyv. Soo Line R.R. Co., 653 E2d 1123, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980).
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emerging body of case law that interprets public nuisance law in
this context and demonstrate that the courts that have dismissed
such claims have generally misunderstood the requirements of the
doctrine. Courts that have permitted the claims to go forward,
however, as well as judges in dissent, have evinced a more
sophisticated understanding of the important role that public
nuisance continues to play in the protection of the public's safety,
health, and welfare. Private claims for public nuisance, on the
other hand, are unnecessary and run the risk of further confusing
an already difficult issue. Careful attention to the mission of public
nuisance also counsels against legislation that limits or denies
municipalities the right to seek abatement of gun violence.
Legislatures should not be handcuffing the cities that deal with the
consequences of gun violence on a daily basis. 5
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the law of public
nuisance, emphasizing those aspects of the doctrine most relevant
to suits against gun sellers. We also explore the distinctions be-
tween claims brought by public entities and those brought by
private citizens and note that the continued existence of the pri-
vate claim contributes to judicial confusion on the proper role of
public nuisance. Part II explores the nature of the public nuisance
created by the conduct of gun sellers. Part III examines recent de-
cisions in which public nuisance claims against the gun industry
have withstood the defendants' motions to dismiss. Special atten-
tion is given to the courts' analysis of the plaintiffs' complaints and
the nature and specificity of the allegations referenced by the
courts. Part IV analyzes the significance of these recent decisions
for future litigation against the gun industry. Part V discusses legis-
lative efforts to shield the gun industry from lawsuits, noting the
flaws in the purported justification for such legislation.
I. APPLICABILITY OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
DOCTRINE TO GUN SALES
In an earlier article, we argued that the law of public nuisance is
poorly understood and applied by courts and legislatures. 2" Since
that time, an increasing number of courts have addressed
public nuisance allegations brought specifically against the gun
25. See Michael R. Bloomberg, Richard M. Daley, James K. Hahn, & Scott L. King, Law-
yers, Guns and Mayors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at A27 (op-ed piece by mayors of major U.S.
cities, arguing against legislative immunity for gun sellers).
26. See Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance, supra note 16.
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27industry by municipalities and, in at least one instance, by a28
state. The results have been decidedly mixed. The decisions in
these cases frequently demonstrate the confusion that exists in the
use of public and private nuisance, 9 impose unduly restrictive•30
causation requirements, and indicate a general fear that public
nuisance law is simply too broad." Recently, however, a growing
number of courts have permitted allegations that the purposeful
conduct of gun sellers has created a public nuisance sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss.
The discussion that follows begins by establishing the general
framework of public nuisance doctrine, with explanatory emphasis
placed on those aspects of the law that have assumed special rele-
vance in gun litigation. We then consider the misguided
arguments that have been most often deployed against using pub-
lic nuisance law in the context of gun sales and distribution.
Exposing the deficiencies of these arguments highlights the
unique propriety of public nuisance claims, as opposed to private
claims, as a vehicle for dealing with the consequences of gun vio-
lence.
A. The "Office" of Public Nuisance
3
Public nuisance law empowers the state to put a stop to actions
that substantially interfere with the public's health, safety, and
27. Some cases have been dismissed. See City of Philadelphia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,
277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A.
Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001); Ganim v. Smith and Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn.
2001). More recently, the trend has been to permit the claims to go forward. For recent
discussion of cases illustrating this trend see infra Parts III, IV.
28. See People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. N.Y. 2003) (affirm-
ing dismissal of State's public nuisance claims).
29. See infra notes 225-40 and accompanying text.
30. A good discussion of the causation issue can be found in NAACP v. Acusport, Inc.,
271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 492-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). The case also highlights the problems that
arise when private plaintiffs attempt to use public nuisance law. See Part I.B. infra and ac-
companying text.
31. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
32. See cases discussed infra Parts III, IV.
33. In People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997), the California Su-
preme Court provided an unusually comprehensive justification for the state's exercise of
public nuisance. Id. The court stated, in part: "[A] principal office of the centuries-old doc-
trine of the 'public nuisance' has been the maintenance of public order-tranquillity [sic],
security and protection-when the criminal law proves inadequate." Id.
FALL 2004]
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34
convenience. Because of this broad definition, courts have some-
times expressed a legitimate concern that the reach of public
nuisance is almost limitless. In People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,35 the
New York appellate court summarized the general judicial wariness
toward the doctrine:
[W] e see on the horizon, were we to expand the reach of the
common-law public nuisance tort in the way plaintiff urges,
the outpouring of an unlimited number of theories of public
nuisance claims for courts to resolve and perhaps impose and
enforce-some of which will inevitably be exotic and fanciful,
wholly theoretical, baseless, or perhaps even politically moti-
vated and exploitative. Such lawsuits could be leveled not
merely against these defendants, but, well beyond them,
against countless other types of commercial enterprises, in
36order to address a myriad of societal problems ....
The New York court reached the wrong result in dismissing the
public nuisance claim," but the general concern is not without
merit. Public nuisance doctrine reflects the state's inherent police
power, arguably government's most basic authority." Since that
power enables states to take whatever steps are needed to protect
both the state itself and its citizens, 39 broad discretion is the
34. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1334 (2000) (defining public nuisance as "a
substantial and unreasonable interference with a right held in common by the general
public, in use of public facilities, in health, safety, and convenience"). The Restatement
similarly identifies public nuisance as "a significant interference with the public health, the
public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (1979). The Restatement adds, "conduct
... proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation," id § 821B(2) (b), or
"conduct... of [either] a continuing nature or [that] has produced a permanent or long-
lasting effect, and ... has a significant effect on the public right," id. § 821B(2) (c). These
latter alternatives have not been the subject of suits brought against gun sellers, however,
and the discussion throughout this Article centers on the core definition of interference
with public health, safety and welfare.
35. People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. N.Y. 2003).
36. Id. at 202-03.
37. We discuss this matter more fully in notes 71-76, infra, and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Gostin et al., supra note 21, at 103-05 (discussing the definition and
breadth of the police power and its relation to nuisance abatement); see also Garcia v. Gray,
507 F.2d 539, 544 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that the "regulation and abatement of nuisances
is one of the basic functions of the police power").
39. While the state's interest in abating public nuisances is an incident of its police
power, its standing to protect the health and safety of its citizens in judicial proceedings is
known as the parens patriae (parent of the country) power. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW 54 (2000). This doctrine enables the state to sue in a case in which no citizen
would be able to allege a specific injury. In the case of public nuisance, we shall see that the
parens patriae power to vindicate the interest of all citizens makes the state a better fit as a
plaintiff than membership organizations, such as the NAACP, to challenge public nuisances.
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doctrine's central characteristic. Although this discretion is
checked in many jurisdictions by requiring that the 4plaintiff prove
public nuisance by clear and convincing evidence, the potential
breadth of public nuisance is obvious.
In addition to imposing a heightened evidentiary burden, the
law has also addressed this concern by explicitly prohibiting cer-
tain potential nuisances by statute. For example, specific statutes
and regulations now address such disparate problems as environ-
mental degradation,4 ' noise,42 unwholesome food,43 and-with
special relevance here-the illegal possession of handguns.4 Such
statutes provide a safety floor for certain regulated conduct, but
these still leave room for public nuisance proceedings as a sup-
plemental remedy. The state must retain its plenary power to
protect the public's health and safety. Without this power, the state
could find itself without means to address serious public health
threats. These threats may arise because of jurisdictional problems,
such as instances where the effects of a permitted nuisance in one
state spill over into a neighboring state. 45 Additionally, when the
As a corollary, states and municipalities may find their complaints dismissed if they do not
sue in a representative capacity, to prevent prospective or on-going harm to their citizens.
The failure to sue in such capacity may have doomed the complaint in Ganim v. Smith and
Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001). See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
40. A good discussion of the point is found in NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d
435,477-80 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
41. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Ojectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1404 n.421 (1991) (identifying relevant federal environmental laws).
42. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-12-101 to -109 (2003) (declaring noise "a major
source of environmental pollution" and authorizing the creation of noise-level standards).
Noise pollution often is regulated through local ordinances. See, e.g., Philadelphia Noise
and Excessive Vibration Regs., promulgated pursuant to PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE Chap. 10-
400 § 10-406 (2003).
43. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 383 (2004) (classifying the knowing sale of adulter-
ated food a misdemeanor offense); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 94. § 4 (2004) (prohibiting the use
of spoiled or contaminated ingredients in bakery products).
44. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05(1) (McKinney 1999) ("Any weapon, instrument,
appliance or substance specified in article [265] [including specified unlicensed firearms
and loaded firearms possessed with the intent to use illegally], when unlawfully possessed,
manufactured, transported or disposed of, or when utilized in the commission of an of-
fense, is ... a nuisance.") Such statutes are instructive in that they establish only a floor for
state action, which public nuisance can supplement. New York State's complaint against
various gun sellers alleged negligence both under the above statute and in common law
nuisance. Compl. at 63-64 (statutory) and 65-66 (common law), New York v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co. (No. 402586/2000). Nonetheless, the complaint was dismissed. New York v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. N.Y. 2003) (affirming trial court dismissal).
The case is discussed further at notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
45. In Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), for example, the State of Missouri was
held to have standing to sue the Chicago sanitation district in federal court for the alleged
public nuisance created by Illinois's decision to create a channel to divert sewage from Lake
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threat or injury to the public's health arises within a state's own
borders, a public nuisance action for abatement or an injunction
might be the only, or best, means of proceeding. For instance, a
toxic chemical may have useful industrial applications, but may
present a danger when accidentally spilled . An action for public
nuisance may then be the most expeditious remedial course.
In the case of gun sales, the nuisance may arise from any num-
ber of activities that unnecessarily increase the health risk posed by
these already-dangerous products. The most outrageous cases are
easy to imagine. For example, a seller who markets and sells a mail-
order gun in pieces, to be assembled by the purchaser, does so for
the purpose of avoiding the whole battery of regulation for the sale
and registration of firearms.47 Such an action clearly imposes a
public health risk, and the state (or the municipality with authority
to act)48 needs abatement authority unless and until legislation ad-
dresses the issue.
The more common allegation by municipalities suing gun sellers
under a public nuisance theory is that the sellers create a nuisance
by marketing, distributing, and selling firearms in a manner that
allows criminals to come into possession of them. 9 As to the
Michigan to the Mississippi River, where it would pollute Missouri's "side" of that river. For a
thorough discussion of the continued vitality of the parens patriae doctrine as applied to
states or the federal government suing on behalf of their citizens, see Larry W. Yackle, A
Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. U.
L. REv. 111 (1997).
46. See, e.g., Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 653 F.2d 1123 (7th Cir. 1980). In
this case, where thousands of gallons of a known toxin spilled into the soil near local wells,
and East Troy was obliged to drill a deep well, the town was permitted to recover the cost of
abating the public nuisance.
47. A case involving such facts is Halberstam v. Daniel (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (No. 95-C3323),
discussed in Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain future of Negligent
Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 681 (1998).
48. The states are the principal repositories of the public nuisance power, but both
statutes and case law often permit local governments to deal with nuisances that arise within
their territorial limits. With special relevance in suits against gun sellers, Illinois law
expressly grants its municipalities the right to bring actions for public nuisance: "The
corporate authorities of each municipality may define, prevent, and abate nuisances." 65
ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 5/11-60-2 (2004); see also ALA. CODE § 11-47-118 (2003) (permitting
local governments to "maintain a civil action to enjoin and abate any public nuisance,
injurious to the health, morals, comfort or welfare of the community or any portion
thereof."). Statutes depriving local governments of this power to abate public nuisance are
discussed in Part V.B, infra. In Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 653 F.2d 1123, 1127 (7th
Cir. 1980), the court interpreted a grant from the state of Wisconsin to village boards to
authorize a nuisance claim even where the words "public nuisance" did not appear, because
the statute spoke of the health and safety of the public.
49. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio
2002). As we have argued, the most powerful complaints are those, such as Chicago's, that
detail particular cases of gun seller misconduct. Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance, supra
note 16, at 320-22. The trial judge's decision dismissing the city's complaint was reversed on
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argument that gun sales are already regulated, the simple response
is that "the law does not regulate the distribution practices
alleged. ... ,50 Gun regulation is far from comprehensive and
"leave s] room for [gunsellers] to be in compliance with [laws]
while still acting unreasonably and creating a public nuisance." 5' In
other words, the defendants' practices are alleged to imperil
public safety, and the state is therefore obliged to abate the
nuisance unless there is explicit statutory authority to the52
contrary.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, abatement is the principal
remedy in public nuisance claims brought by states or their local
agents. This usual remedy follows naturally from the very "office"
of public nuisance law, which is to eliminate the interference with
the public's health or safety. Thus, the focus is on the interference
and its removal, not on the culpability of the defendant's con-
duct. 4 In the context of guns that make their way into the hands of
criminals, abatement might require manufacturers and distribu-
tors to monitor dealers-particularly those who have a history of
selling guns to criminals-and require gun sellers to cooperate in
studies that seek to determine the market for the lawful use of fire-
55
arms.
appeal. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), rev'd,
2004 Ill. LEXIS 1665 (Nov. 18, 2004).
50. City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1143.
51. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson, Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1235 (Ind. 2003). The
court cited the homely example of a hog farm that could become a public nuisance because
of its locality or the manner of its operation, even though hog farming is a lawful enterprise.
Id. at 1234 n.9 (citing Yeager & Sullivan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 324 N.E.2d 846, 852 (Ind. App.
1975)).
52. See Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance, supra note 16, at 302 ("In the case of a lawful
product such as guns, the public nuisance emerges from conduct that poses a threat to public health
and safety beyond what the legislature contemplated.").
53. See supra note 48.
54. See People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 208 (App. Div. N.Y. 2003)
(Rosenberger, J., dissenting) ("[S]tate-initiated public nuisance abatement claims are
founded on the theory that the State can obtain abatement of a condition that is injurious
to the public. As such they are not negligence actions, nor are they governed by negligence
concepts."). Nevertheless, the connection between conduct and culpability is quite close in
cases involving gun sellers' creation of public nuisances.
55. The Chicago complaint seeks just such relief. Compl. at 4 (a)-(c) (prohibiting
certain kinds of illegal sales), 4 (d) (e) (asking court to require training, supervision
and monitoring of dealers, and to terminate uncooperative dealers), 4 (g) (asking that
manufacturers and distributors "participate in a court-ordered study of lawful demand for
firearms and ... cease sales in excess of lawful demand"), City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp. (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1998) (No. 98-CH-15596).
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Damages may also be appropriate in public nuisance cases, but
16
only insofar as they contribute to the abatement. For example, a
city should be able to recover the costs of cleaning up a toxic spill
from the party that created it, whether the spill was caused by
negligence or not, and regardless of whether the defendant was
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. Where the city has
taken steps to abate the nuisance that the sale of guns has caused,
damages might properly be recoverable for expenses that can be
reasonably traced to doing so. Thus, if a city could demonstrate
that it needed a certain number of additional police officers to
deal with the increased violence caused by gun sellers' supplying
an illegal secondary market, a link might be made between the
expenditure and the abatement-decreased violence. The city
would face a daunting challenge on demonstrating the causal link,
but that difficulty should not result in the dismissal of the
complaint, especially since the concern for the public good,
embodied by nuisance law, counsels in favor of an expansive view
• 57
of causation.
On the other hand, damages that do not contribute to the
abatement are not properly recoverable by a governmental entity
under public nuisance law. Thus, for example, while the increased
expenditure on emergency room costs and other medical treat-
ment incurred as a result of gun violence do cost cities dearly,
their recovery may not be proper under public nuisance doctrine.
Of course, if a city could show property damage or economic loss,
it could sue under theories of tort law-but not under public nui-
sance.58 To the extent that the damages are the result of
negligence, liability for a defective product, or carrying on an ab-
normally dangerous activity, for instance, the city could recover for
its loss to the extent that a private plaintiff would. Economic loss
claims are also possible, but face a much more difficult path.59
56. The recently defeated federal immunity bill would have had an uncertain effect
on municipal suits for public nuisance. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. The bill
prohibited actions for damages, but did not speak to the issue of abatement or injunctive
relief. The interesting issue is whether damages incident to abatement or injunctive relief
would have been possible. We discuss the bill in greater detail in Part VA, infra.
57. NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[Wlhere the
welfare and safety of an entire community is at stake, the cause need not be so proximate as
in individual negligence cases.").
58. For a discussion of the distinction between suits by public entities in their capaci-
ties as property owners and in their purely public roles, see Note, Recovering the Costs of Public
Nuisance Abatement: The Public and Private City Sue the Gun Industry, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1521
(2000).
59. When the defendant's misconduct causes "only" economic loss, courts are reluc-
tant to grant recovery. The reasons for this reluctance are well-summarized in FRANCIS
TRINIDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 370-75 (3d ed. 2000). In cases
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B. Outside the "Office"?: Confining Public Nuisance
Claims to Their Proper Sphere
As described above, public nuisance is an incident of the state's
police power and not a tort. This statement would not need to be
made, except that, by a quirk of legal history, public nuisance is
also the basis of a private tort claim. Elsewhere, we have summa-
rized the serpentine route by which this entity came to serve dual60
purposes, and have argued that the tort of public nuisance serves
61 62
no important purpose, leads to unnecessary confusion, andS 63...
should be abolished. The unfolding gun litigation has reinforced
this conviction.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, private plaintiffs had
begun to sue under a public nuisance tort theory, 64 and were
successful when the public nuisance visited a harm on them
65different in kind from that suffered by the general public. To use
a dramatic example, one court held that people who developed
leukemia as a result of groundwater pollution could state a claim
for public nuisance, because their injury was obviously different66
and greater than that suffered by others in the town. This tort of
public nuisance continues to be generally recognized today, and
involving a limited class of especially foreseeable plaintiffs, recovery may be permitted. See,
e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979); People Express Airlines, Inc. v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985). Municipal plaintiffs might have difficulty es-
tablishing such status, but the outcome is far from certain.
60. Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance, supra note 16, at 292-95.
61. Id. at 312 (noting that courts have not permitted litigants to avoid the require-
ments of fault by pleading public nuisance).
62. Id. at 311-12.
63. Id. at 311.
64. Id. at 293.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (1979). The Second Restate-
ment's rule is for damage actions only. Id. But, a private individual has the right to seek an
injunction where he or she has "the right to recover damages," (by having a special injury
different in kind) or "[has] standing to sue as a representative of the general public, as a
citizen in a citizen's action or as a member of a class in a class action." Id. § 821C (2) (a) &
(c). In commentj to this section, the Restatement notes that statutes may provide individuals
with a right to sue on the public's behalf, and then cryptically adds that "extensive general
developments regarding class actions and standing to sue are ... pertinent." To the extent
that the plaintiff may have standing to assert the interests and rights of a governmental en-
tity, this Article's objection to private suits for public nuisance does not apply. Neither of the
private suits for public nuisance discussed in Part III concerns such a situation, even though
NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), involves an organization's
effort to stand in the shoes of its members-a group that is large, but less than the entire
population. The devastating findings of fact made by the court in that case, though, should
be used by the state or municipal government in a proper public nuisance suit.
66. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D. Mass. 1986).
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there appears to be no serious movement underway to dislodge it
from the law.
Nonetheless, public nuisance as a tort should be eliminated for
two broad reasons. First, it serves no useful purpose. Those injured
by tortious conduct have other avenues of redress available-
negligence; strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity;
product liability theories; and private nuisance claims for interfer-
ences with the use and enjoyment of land that do not amount to
67
trespasses. More significantly, if the defendant's conduct is not
culpable in some way, principles of corrective justice do not permit
the private plaintiff to recover from the defendant.H In practice,
courts have not permitted recovery by private plaintiffs in public
69
nuisance suits without a showing of some fault. What purpose,
then, does the tort of public nuisance serve that cannot be accom-
plished by other claims?
7
1
67. One confusion that exists in the cases is the view that only interferences with the
land can constitute a public nuisance. But such interferences are properly the subject mat-
ter of actions for private nuisance. In contrast, public nuisance may, but need not, involve
an unreasonable interference with the land. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 194 E Supp. 2d
1040, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev'd in part, affd in part, remanded, 349 E3d 1191 (9th Cir.
2003).
68. See sources cited in Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance, supra note 16, at 314 n.167.
See also John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. REv.
1027, 1073 (2003) [hereinafter Culhane, Two Kinds ofjustice] (discussing and defending an
expanded notion of corrective justice). Corrective justice also requires a showing that the
defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. It is debatable, however, whether
corrective justice imposes any particular evidentiary threshold for demonstrating the causal
link between conduct and injury. See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective
Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAw OF TORTS 214, 232-36 (GeraldJ.
Postema ed., 2001). The showing required may be more or less stringent, depending on
such factors as the availability of evidence, see Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 nn.3-5 (Cal.
1948) (shifting burden of proof on causation to two negligent defendants where conduct of
only one could have caused plaintiff's injury), and the role of the defendant in creating
obstacles to establishing the causal connection, see, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d
465 (Cal. 1970) (drowning in hotel pool where negligence consisted of failing to provide
either a lifeguard or a warning; emphasizing that lack of evidence was attributable to hotel's
negligent failure to provide lifeguard). Judges have sometimes stated that the causal
connection needed for a public entity's success in a public nuisance claim is less powerful
than that required in a private action. See, e.g., NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435,
495-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 209-10 (App. Div.
N.Y. 2003) (Rosenberger, J., dissenting) (suggesting that remoteness is relevant only to what
abatement actions may be appropriate). This position is justifiable for at least two reasons.
As just noted, causation requirements are flexible in the first place. Further, even though
corrective justice concepts are at best fitfully applied to claims by public entities to abate
nuisances, the public's interest combines with the defendant's injurious conduct to argue
for an expansive view of causation in public nuisance claims.
69. See Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance, supra note 16, at 312.
70. One possibility is that courts would use the requirements for establishing a public
nuisance as a way of specifically defining the duty that is needed for a negligence claim. To
the extent that doing so provides a focus for the otherwise amorphous duty analysis, the
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The second problem with the tort of public nuisance is made
manifest in the gun suits filed by public entities: Courts have too
often confused the exercise of the state's police power with the
private tort claim, and with tort principles more generally. No-
where was this error more evident than in People v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., 7 the suit brought by the State of New York against gun sellers.
In this case, the court's reasons for affirming the dismissal of the
public nuisance claim reflected a dismaying conflation of negli-
gence and nuisance doctrine. First, the court undertook a duty
analysis more appropriate to a negligence claim, and agreed with
another court that had dismissed a public nuisance claim against
gun sellers on the basis that public nuisance could otherwise
"'devour in one gulp the entire law of tort.' ,12 But actions under-
taken by municipalities to deal with threats to public health and
safety have nothing to do with tort, and the fear of limitless liability
the court mentioned has no relevance to a true public nuisance
claim. As long as the threat to public health remains, the state
must deal with it.
Compounding the error, the Sturm, Ruger court then noted
problems with proximate cause because of the intervention of
third-party criminal actors. Such intervention is not even fatal to a
private tort claim,4 but its relevance to a public nuisance claim is
slighter still. Nowhere does the court evince awareness that the
public health mission of public nuisance law commends a more
expansive view of causation.
Only Judge Rosenberger, in an incisive dissent in Sturm, Ruger,
fully understood the differences between private nuisance, a pri-
vate action for public nuisance, and a true public nuisance claim
brought by a public entity:
While private nuisance claims and public nuisance claims for
damages incorporate traditional negligence notions of fore-
seeability, proximate cause and fault, state-initiated public
nuisance abatement claims are founded on the theory that
Authors do not object to its use, but continue to believe it is preferable that confusion be
avoided by abandoning the separate tort of public nuisance.
71. 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. N.Y. 2003).
72. Id. at 197, quoting Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3d Cir. 2001).
73. Id. at 200-02.
74. See Eggen & Culhane, Gun Torts, supra note 8, at 203-04.
75. Cf NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 496-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating
that proximate cause determination for public nuisance is "less restrictive" than for individ-
ual tort claims).
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the State can obtain abatement of a condition that is injurious
to the public. As such they are not negligence actions, nor are
76they governed by negligence concepts.
As we shall demonstrate in Part III, courts have yet to fully appreci-
ate these distinctions.
II. THE PROBLEM: LEGAL CONDUCT, ILLEGAL MARKET
Public nuisance complaints typically indict gun manufacturers
and dealers for their conduct that contributes to the illegal secon-
dary market for guns. The loose patchwork of laws that regulate
the sale and distribution of guns creates fertile ground for exploi-
tation by criminals. The laws also enable gun sellers to facilitate
such exploitation. The following discussion describes the interplay
of scant regulation and wrongful conduct that fosters the devel-
opment of the illegal secondary market and that provides the
foundation for the public nuisance claims.
Guns are lethal products and enhancement of this inherent le-
thality has been on the rise. A disturbing trend in gun design has
emerged since 1980, in which guns have been designed to increase
firepower and provide easier concealability. For example, in 1980,
semiautomatic handguns constituted only thirty-two percent of all
guns produced in the United States." In 1999, that number had
increased to seventy-five percent." Researchers have reported that
public demand for higher caliber guns and guns with larger am-
munition magazines has risen since 1993. In response,
manufacturers have made and marketed more lethal guns, evenS 80
though safer alternative designs have been available. For exam-
ple, statistics collected in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated that in
1985, the ratio of revolvers to semiautomatic pistols produced was
8.44 revolvers to 7.07 semiautomatic pistols; by 1993, that ratio had
76. Sturm, Ruger, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
77. VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, FACTS ON FIREARMS, http://www.vpc.org/fact-sht/
firearm.htm (citing data obtained from BATF, with percentages calculated by the Violence
Policy Center) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
78. Id.
79. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership
and Use of Firearms, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF 5 (May 1997).
80. Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as
Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1193, 1197 (2000).
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shifted dramatically to 22 semiautomatic pistols for every 5.5 re-
volvers produced."'
In addition to the general increase in production of more lethal
firearms, manufacturers have designed certain guns with specific
features that appeal to criminals and that do not have legitimate
uses.8 2 Navegar, Inc.'s semiautomatic assault weapons, the TEC-9
and TEC-DC9, provide an example. These guns were modeled on
military and police assault weapons; they have no legitimate use for
hunting or other sports, or even self-defense, due to their inaccuracy
and danger to the shooter.83 The manufacturer claimed that it mar-
keted them to survivalists and persons wanting to "'play military.'" 84
These guns could be fired at high velocity, spray-fired, and broken
down into easily concealable parts. Furthermore, they could be eas-
ily modified to become fully automatic . s Not surprisingly, according
to experts, these weapons are at the top of the list of assault weapons
. .. 86 ...
used in crimes in the United States. It is impossible to imagine that
manufacturers cannot foresee this outcome.
81. Id. at 1198 n.27. In absolute numbers, this means that in 1993, gun manufacturers
produced 2.2 million semiautomatic pistols, compared to 550,000 revolvers. Id. (citing Bu-
REAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, ANNUAL FIREARMS MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORT
REPORT (1994)); see also Garen G. Wintemute, The Relationship Between Firearm Design and
Firearm Violence: Handguns in the 1990s, 275 J.A.M.A. 1749, 1749 (1996) ("For fatal shootings
and nonfatal violence alike, semiautomatic pistols have increasingly replaced revolvers
among crime-involved firearms.").
82. Cf Wintemute, supra note 81, at 1752-53 (discussing popular new features on
handguns to reduce recoil and allow for fast target acquisition, but noting that manufactur-
ers claim that these features are helpful when guns are used for defense).
83. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 154-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28
P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). This weapon was used in shootings in an office building in San Fran-
cisco by an individual who had told the gun dealer that he was interested in the weapon for
home defense or target practice. Id. The two opinions in this case offer summaries of sub-
stantial testimony about the lethal features of this weapon and its uselessness for any
purpose other than a shooting rampage. Id. One expert witness characterized this weapon
as "'mass-produced mayhem.'" Id. at 155. This weapon was also used by the killers in the
Columbine High School shootings in Littleton, Colorado. See MichaelJanofsky, Both Sides See
Momentum in Congress for Gun Contro4 N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at A18.
84. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156 (quoting testimony of manufacturer's national sales
and marketing director from 1989 to 1993).
85. Id. at 154.
86. The California Court of Appeal in Merrill v. Navegar Inc., stated:
Just ten models account for 90 percent of the crimes in which assault weapons are
used, and one out of every five was a TEC-9, putting it at the top of the list. According
to BATF's Tracing Center, the TEC-9 or TEC-DC9 accounted for 3,710 of the fire-
arms traced to crime by law enforcement officials nationwide during 1990-1993,
mainly cases involving narcotics, murder and assault, and these weapons were in the
top ten firearms traced.
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While some federal and state laws regulate the sale and use of
firearms, the incomplete system of laws is insufficient to prevent
guns from presenting a threat to the public's safety. In general,
regulations focus on the conduct of parties other than the manu-
facturers. The federal Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended by the
Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act ("Brady Act"),"' provides
118a system of dealer licensing and limits gun sales to those between
licensed dealers and residents of the dealer's state. 9 The Act also
prohibits sales to certain categories of persons, such as felons and
persons formerly confined in mental hospitals,9° and requires
background checks on all purchasers. 91 Finally, the Act establishes
the authority of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms ("BATF") to carry out certain licensing, taxing, and export
tasks. 9' The Act and the BATF regulations apply almost exclusively
to sales by manufacturers and licensed firearms dealers. They do
not provide any upstream regulation.
State regulation adds little to the pattern of minimal regulation.
As with federal law, state gun laws generally regulate gun pur-
chases, not matters related to manufacturing or marketing. While
a few states, as well as the District of Columbia, ban certain kinds
of handguns,93 generally the state bans duplicate the ban in the
Brady Act. Some states impose their own requirements on gun
94
sales, while others impose restrictions on the carrying of a gun on
Id. at 155 (discussing the Cox Newspaper report, BATF tracing data, and testimony of ex-
pert in firearms). The court rejected Navegar's challenge of this data. See id. at 166.
87. Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). In September, 2004, Con-
gress allowed a 1994 assault-weapon ban amending the Act to expire. David Olinger, Debate
Doesn't Expire with Assault-Weapon Ban, DENVER POST, Sept. 14, 2004, at A-1.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2004).
89. Id. § 922(a) (5), (b)(3).
90. See id. § 922(g) (1)-(8).
91. Id. § 922(s), (t). In addition, the Act prohibits the sale of all firearms to persons
under the age of eighteen, and the sale of handguns to persons under the age of twenty-
one. Id. § 922(b) (1).
92. 27 C.F.R. §§ 47, 53 (2003).
93. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2502.02 (2004) (banning sawed-off shotguns, machine
guns, short-barreled rifles, and new acquisitions of handguns); MINN. STAT. § 624.716
(2003) (making selling of a "Saturday Night Special" a gross misdemeanor); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:39-5(f) (2004) (prohibiting possession of assault weapons). Shortly before the election
of 2004, the House of Representatives passed the ill-named D.C. Personal Protection Act
(H.R. 3193) by a vote of 250 to 171 that would effectively repeal the D.C. ban. See Spencer S.
Hsu, House Votes to Repeal D.C. Gun Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at BI. Widely believed
to have been an election-year maneuver, the measure has little chance of passage in the
Senate. Id.
94. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129C (2002) (requiring firearm identification
cards); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 29, § 03.01.09(A) (2001) (requiring reporting of gun sales to
state officials); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-2(a)(5)(a) (2004) (imposing seven-day waiting pe-
riod for purchase of a handgun).
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one's person or in a vehicle. Nothing, however, prevents guns
with little or no sporting utility from moving freely across state
lines, as they often do, and being used in the commission of
crimes.96
Most significantly, once a gun has left the hands of a licensed
dealer, no regulation applies. This means that a purchaser can
turn around and sell the gun to anyone, including any person to
whom a licensed dealer is not permitted to sell. This "secondary98
market" occurs on the streets and at gun shows. Also contributing
to the secondary market are straw purchases by which a licensed
dealer legally sells to a person who is merely standing in for an-
other person who would not be permitted to acquire the gun on
the legal primary market. A substantial number of the guns ac-
quired on the unregulated secondary market are used to commit
crimes. Indeed, many of the purchasers are convicted criminals or
persons who intend to use the gun in the commission of a crime.
Some experts have estimated that about half of the gun transac-
tions annually are on the unregulated secondary market.9
While most legal purchasers prefer to deal on the primary mar-
ket, federal and state regulation makes the secondary market
appealing to many persons, including those who cannot legally
acquire firearms in the primary market and those who prefer the
convenience of an unregulated market.0° Some statistics have
shown that approximately two million gun transactions occur an-
nually on the secondary market. 1
There are numerous ways for a person to skirt the legal channels
for purchasing a gun. One way is to purchase guns from an unlawful
dealer.02 Some dealers shamelessly supply guns to persons known to
95. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.12(C) (2003) (allowing carrying of con-
cealed weapon for certain defensive purposes, among others); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 411.172 (2004) (defining eligibility to carry concealed weapon).
96. For example, the guns used in the shootings forming the basis of the claims in
Merrill v. Navegar Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal.
2001) were purchased in Nevada, while the shootings occurred in California. Id. at 153-54.
97. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 79, at 5.
98. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
99. Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59,69-70 (1995).
100. Id. at 71-72.
101. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 79, at 7 (reporting that, in addition to secondary mar-
ket sales, hundreds of thousands of guns are stolen annually from households in the United
States).
102. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS, FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORC-
ING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS TRAFFICKERS 12 (2000) ("Licensed dealers, including
pawnbrokers, have access to a large volume of firearms, so a corrupt licensed dealer can
illegally divert large numbers of firearms.").
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be trafficking in the illegal secondary market.103 Many gun manu-
facturers do not curtail their supply of guns to such dealers, even
where the dealer has a history of numerous federal law viola-
tions."'
In certain circumstances, even dealers who obey the law can sell
guns to persons who cannot legally purchase them. The Brady Act
requires a waiting period of three days to allow for a background
check on the purchaser before the sale can be completed.*15 The
dealer can finalize the sale at the expiration of the three days, even
if the background check has not been completed by that time.
There are numerous instances in which the background check ul-
timately reveals a criminal record or other information that should
have prevented the purchaser from acquiring the gun, but by thenS 106
it is too late. Additionally, lawful dealers often contribute to the
secondary market problem by having lax security, which leads to
theft and the flow of stolen weapons into the unregulated mar-
ket.
10 7
Another method of circumventing federal and state firearms
laws is the straw purchase. Dealers could be trained to detect these
purchases, and many would be prevented. But some of the sales
are egregiously illegal transactions carried out by dealers who are
complicit in the transaction. Here, for example, is a description of
a sting operation undertaken by the police department for the City
of Chicago, which was caught on videotape:
103. An extreme example of such dealer misconduct is provided in BRADY CENTER TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE LEGAL ACTION PROJECT, SMOKING GUNS: EXPOSING THE GUN
INDUSTRY'S COMPLICITY IN THE ILLEGAL GUN MARKET 3 (2003) [hereinafter BRADY
CENTER, SMOKING GUNS]. Notwithstanding the fact that this dealer was arrested for violating
federal firearms law and even trained its employees to skirt the provisions of the law, gun
manufacturers continued to supply the dealer with products. Id. Some gun manufacturers
take the position that if a dealer continues to hold a federal firearms license, the
manufacturer will continue to supply guns to that dealer regardless of the dealer's history of
violations. Id. at 5.
104. Id. at 3.
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), (t) (2004). The Brady Act states that "[A] licensed importer,
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer shall not transfer a firearm to any other person
who is not licensed under this chapter unless ... (B) (ii) 3 business days ... have elapsed
since the licensee contacted the system, and the system has not notified the licensee that the
receipt of a firearm by such other person would violate subsection (g) or (n) of this section
." Id. § 922 (t)(1)(B) (ii) (citations omitted).
106. BRADY CENTER, SMOKING GUNS, supra note 103, at 13. The Brady Center report
details information on manufacturer and dealer practices regarding the sale of firearms in
the United States that have been revealed by gun industry insiders, mostly in the course of
testifying in litigation. See id. at 17-25.
107. Id. at 13-14.
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[P]olice in the Chicago area conducted an undercover sting
operation prior to that city's filing of a lawsuit against the gun
industry. Pairs of undercover officers went to gun stores to
make straw purchases, with one officer expressly stating that
he was a convicted felon or juvenile and asking if the other
person could fill out the legal paperwork so that he could ob-
tain a gun despite the laws prohibiting him from doing so. In
almost every instance, the dealers were willing to supply guns
to a person they believed to be an unlawful buyer.'
In another deception, a dealer sold an undercover officer a
TEC-9 assault pistol when the officer said he was looking to pur-
chase a gun and intended to kill a person who owed him money.l09
Similar sting operations were conducted in other cities."0 The
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence has reported that BATF
held a meeting in 1995 with representatives of gun manufacturers
and firearms trade associations at which BATF urged that the in-
dustry make the problem of straw purchases a priority."' Yet, this
problem has persisted.
Gun shows have provided another means for circumventing the
regulation of sales. Licensed dealers must still follow all regula-
tions while making sales at a gun show, but sales by collectors at
such shows are unregulated. Gun shows are known to be a major
source of guns for criminals.1 2 Without background checks that
are required for licensed dealers, criminals and other persons who
could not otherwise obtain guns legally may easily -acquire them."1
Some licensed dealers operate illegally at gun shows by selling
firearms without following the state and federal regulations that
apply to them."4 Although a small number of gun manufacturers
108. Id. at 6-7.
109. Id. at 6 (describing various guises used by undercover Chicago police officers to
purchase guns, virtually all of which made clear to the dealer that the purchaser intended to
use the guns illegally).
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id. at 9.
112. See ATF & DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GUN SHOWS: BRADY CHECKS AND CRIME GUN
TRACES 6-9 (1999) [hereinafter ATF & DOJ, GUN SHOWS]. The ATF report states: "To-
gether, the ATF investigations paint a disturbing picture of gun shows as a venue for
criminal activity and a source of firearms used in crimes." Id. at 7.
113. The guns used in the 1999 Columbine High School shootings in Littleton, Colo-
rado, were purchased at gun shows. Michael Janofsky, Both Sides See Momentum in Congress for
Gun Contro N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at Al8.
114. ATF & DOJ, GUN SHOWS, supra note 112, at8.
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has attempted to prohibit their products from being sold at gun
shows,"' most have not taken any steps to do so.
Finally, the practice of lawful dealers selling guns in large vol-
umes to legal purchasers supplies the secondary market with much
of its inventory." 6 Although the Brady Act requires licensed dealers
to report multiple sales of handguns to law enforcement agen-
cies, this provision has no teeth to prevent the sales in the first
instance. It is easy to conceive of any number of controls that
could be put into place to minimize the flow of guns to the secon-
dary market through multiple gun sales. For example, these
controls could entail dealer policies limiting such sales, or manu-
facturer policies limiting sales to dealers known to market large
volumes of guns to some purchasers. These policies, of course,
would be voluntary measures established by the manufacturers and
dealers. Virtually none of these measures has been put into place,
however.""
The gun industry is well aware of these practices that feed and
facilitate the secondary market and place guns in the hands of
criminals and other persons likely to use them irresponsibly.' Fur-
thermore, the tracing of firearms by the BATF entails
communication between BATF and gun manufacturers, making
the manufacturers aware of which of their guns were used in
crimes and where they were used. ' Thus, manufacturers can de-
termine which of their dealers were implicated in the movement of
the guns used in crimes and, presumably, determine undesirable
patterns. Ideally, the manufacturers would curtail their own mar-
115. BRADY CENTER, SMOKING GUNS, supra note 103, at 12. The Brady Center report
noted, in particular, that gun manufacturer Heckler & Koch put in place a policy of not
selling directly to dealers known to be operating at gun shows, though no controls were
placed on sales to wholesale distributors who then sold to such dealers. Id.
116. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION
INITIATIVE, CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS (2000), NATIONAL REPORT ix (2002) ("The acquisi-
tion of handguns in multiple sales can be an important trafficking indicator. Handguns sold
in multiple sales reported to the National Tracing Center accounted for 20 percent of all
handguns sold and traced in 2000.") The ATF report also observes that although "most
crime guns were bought from [a licensed dealer] by someone other than their criminal
possessor, many crime guns were recovered soon after their initial purchase." Id. This short
"time-to-crime" suggests the intent of the purchaser to sell the gun on the secondary market
or otherwise divert it into the hands of a criminal. Id.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3) (A) (2004). The Brady Center has reported that some deal-
ers avoid these reporting requirements by transferring possession of purchased handguns
on separate days, separated by the required five-day waiting period. BRADY CENTER, SMOK-
ING GUNS, supra note 103, at 10.
118. SeeBRADY CENTER, SMOKING GUNS, supra note 103, at 10-11.
119. See generally id. at 17-28 (discussing dealer surveys and trade association memo-
randa).
120. Id. at 34-35.
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ket practices that are likely to put their guns in the hands of crimi-
nals. Because they have not done so, the secondary market remains
as strong and as unregulated as ever. Lawsuits, particularly those
brought by municipalities to abate the practices leading to gun vio-
lence, can play a valuable role in deterring manufacturer and
dealer conduct that supplies the secondary market.
III. WINDS OF CHANGE: RECENT CASES ALLOWING
PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS
A. Suits by Public Plaintiffs
Public entities have recently withstood motions to dismiss public
nuisance claims arising out of the activities of gun sellers. In 1998,
in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation,2 1 the City of Chicago
and Cook County, Illinois, brought an action against various gun
manufacturers, distributors and dealers. The core of the plaintiffs'
amended complaint was a claim for public nuisance based upon
alleged marketing practices of the defendants. The allegations
stated that the defendants knowingly and unreasonably caused the
establishment of an illegal market in guns including, among other
things, oversupplying the market with guns in geographic areas
where regulations are weakest and failing to take steps to minimize
the danger.122 The plaintiffs sought monetary damages to reim-
burse the public entities for costs incurred in dealing with the
public nuisance, including hospital and related emergency costs,
criminal justice system costs, and health care costs. In addition, the
plaintiffs sought punitive damages and a permanent injunction to
abate the nuisance. 123 The trial court, in an oral ruling, granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in
124its entirety, focusing largely on the causation issue.
121. 785 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), rev'd, 2004 Ill. LEXIS 1665 (Nov. 18, 2004).
122. Id. at 21.
123. Id. at 22.
124. Id. at 22-23 (quoting trial court's oral ruling of Sept. 15, 2000). The trial court re-
jected the statistical information submitted by the plaintiffs as proof of causation. Id. Noting
that the state of Illinois has an "aversion to statistical bases for causes of actions," the court
held that the statistical data regarding the gun industry generally did not provide proof of
misconduct on the part of any particular defendant. Id. at 22 (quoting the trial court as
saying that "[t]his is not the basis that an Illinois court can use as essentially almost the sole
basis for deciding whether individual parties are responsible for a public nuisance"). This
statement is reminiscent of arguments made by defendants in toxic torts cases, another area
of law in which statistical evidence has provided a large portion of the proof submitted by
FALL 2004]
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On appeal, the court focused on the arguments of the defen-
dants that the allegations of the plaintiffs did not amount to an
unreasonable interference with a public right. The court applied
the principles set forth in the Second Restatement of Torts, and
emphasized that the requirements to state a public nuisance are
"not strenuous" because the concept of public nuisance is broad. 125
Quoting extensively from the plaintiffs' second amended com-
plaint, the appellate court concluded that the allegations
sufficiently pleaded an interference with a public right by stating
that citizens have been placed in "'unreasonable jeopardy... from
conduct that creates a disturbance and reasonable apprehension
of danger to person and property."'12 6 The court noted the particu-
lars of the allegations, including the statement that the defendants
"'caus[ed] thousands of firearms to be possessed and used in Chi-
cago illegally, which results in a higher level of crime, death and
injuries to Chicago citizens, a higher level of fear, discomfort and
inconvenience to the residents... and increased costs to the plain-
tiffs to investigate and prosecute crimes.... ,
plaintiffs in support of their cases. Epidemiological evidence, which has been defined as the
statistical "study of relationships between the frequency and distribution, and the factors
that may influence frequency and distribution, of diseases and injuries in human popula-
tions," UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TCHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE 163 (1985), results in a determination of risk factors
only. Thus, epidemiological evidence submitted in support of personal-injury claims in toxic
torts suits has been criticized because it does not prove definitively that the exposure in
question caused the occurrence of the disease in the plaintiff, notwithstanding a statistical
connection between the exposure and the illness. See generally Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic
Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence After Daubert, 55 U. PITr. L. REv. 889, 897-903 (1994)
(discussing the challenge of probabilistic evidence, including epidemiology, in toxic torts
cases and judicial resistance to its use in the courtroom). For a criticism of the strict separa-
tion between statistical and individual causation, see John G. Culhane, The Emperor Has No
Causation: Exposing a Judicial Misconstruction of Science, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 185, 195-98
(1997). Nevertheless, many courts have used statistical evidence of risk in allowing plaintiffs'
tort claims to proceed. See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th
Cir. 1986) (accepting "frequenc); regularity, and proximity" test to support reasonable in-
ference of causation); Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 816 E2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the challenge of statistical evidence
and providing a list of other factors to assist plaintiffs in establishing causation); Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (1980) (establishing market share liability when defendant can-
not be determined); see a/soJean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Hazards
in the Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers' Compensation Systems, 60 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 843 (1992) (discussing problems of scientific uncertainty in tort and workers'
compensation systems and recommending judicial and legislative reforms). Some of the
steps taken in the area of toxic torts causation could provide a basis forjudicial use of statis-
tical information in public nuisance cases against the gun industry.
125. 785 N.E.2d at 24.
126. Id. (quoting plaintiffs' complaint at 84).
127. Id. at 24-25 (quoting plaintiffs' complaint at 84).
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The defendants' arguments focused primarily on the assertion
that the gun sellers' activities were legal. While regulation of the
enterprise alleged to create a public nuisance may be relevant to a
determination of the existence of a nuisance, compliance with
regulations does not preclude a finding of nuisance. The court
indicated that the allegations in this complaint focused on the
creation of an illegal secondary market, which existed precisely to
sidestep the regulatory requirements. "9 Thus, according to the
plaintiffs, the defendants could comply with regulatory mandates
while taking advantage of gaps in the legislation to undermine the
regulatory purpose. Similarly, the court discounted the defen-
dants' argument that they could not be held liable for public
nuisance because they had no control over the actions of the third
parties using the guns at the times the violence occurred.' s°
Though perhaps relevant to negligence, the court ruled that this
fact did not relieve the defendants of liability for public nui-
131
sance.
Similarly, in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 132 the City
brought suit against companies involved in the distribution and sale
of guns, naming in the amended complaint eleven manufacturers,
128. Id. at 27-28.
129. Id. at 30.
130. The defendants' argument relied upon cases in other jurisdictions dismissing suits
against gun-industry defendants for lack of control over their guns after the guns were sold.
The court distinguished these cases as all involving claims other than public nuisance, typi-
cally negligence and strict liability. Public nuisance, the court stated, has a different set of
requirements. Id. at 26-27.
131. Id. at 30. As this article was going to press, the Illinois Supreme Court handed
down its ruling in the case just discussed in the text. The court reversed the appellate
court's decision, and dismissed the city's public nuisance lawsuit. City of Chicago v. Beretta
U.S.. Corp., 2004 Il. LEXIS 1665 (Nov. 18, 2004). Although the opinion was not to be-
come final until 21 days later (at the conclusion of the period in which the city could
petition for rehearing), the unanimity of the decision makes a different outcome unlikely.
In holding that the city had not stated a claim for public nuisance, the court stated that in
cases involving heavily regulated industries, a court would declare an activity a public nui-
sance only if the statutes were themselves violated, or "where the defendant was otherwise
negligent." Id. 2004 Il. LEXIS 1665 (Nov. 18, 2004), *58, quoting Gilmore v. Stanmar, 633
N.E.2d 985, 993 (Il1. App. 1994). Gilmore, however, was a private action for damages. In that
context, courts have routinely prevented plaintiffs from using nuisance law as an end-run
around the requirement that the defendant's conduct be culpable as a condition of liability.
See Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance, supra note 16, at 312. The Illinois Supreme Court's
reliance on a case involving a private claim for public nuisance again emphasizes the point
that we have made here and in Public Nuisance. that private claims for public nuisance serve
no legitimate purpose, lead to confusion, and should be abolished. The court made the
same error-conflating nuisance and negligence principles-as that decried by Judge
Rosenberger in Sturm, Ruger. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
132. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
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one wholesaler, and five retailers.1 3 The complaint alleged claims
of public nuisance, negligent distribution of guns, and negligent
design. The allegations centered upon certain distribution and
sales practices that provided access to guns for illegal purchasers-
such as criminals and juveniles-including "straw purchases" and
failure of dealers to comply with federal requirements. 3 4 The City
further alleged that the manufacturers knew of the illegal practices
in the chain of distribution and failed to change the system even
though they had the ability to do so.3 5 The Indiana Supreme Court





The court began its discussion with the Indiana nuisance statute,
originally enacted in 1881, which provides that a nuisance
is something that is "'(1) injurious to health; (2) indecent;
(3) offensive to the senses; or (4) an obstruction to the free use of
property . . . ., ,,13 The court interpreted the statute to contain an
implicit requirement that the activities alleged be unreasonable.
3
1
The City's chief allegation of public nuisance was that
"'[d] efendants affirmatively rely upon the reasonably foreseeable
laxness of dealers, and employees, and the ingenuity of criminals
to ensure that thousands of handguns find their way into their
expected place in the illegal secondary market.' ,139After analyzing
the defendants' arguments, the court held that the City stated a
claim for public nuisance. 4°
The defendants raised two familiar arguments-that their activi-
ties were lawful and that public nuisance claims should be
confined to activities involving the use of real property. Put other-
wise, as stated by one retailer-defendant, must a defendant's
conduct constitute an independent tort to allow a public nuisance
claim? 4' According to the court, no such tort need exist. Although
the defendants correctly indicated that Indiana had a long history
of applying public nuisance law in situations of illegal activity or in
133. Id. at 1227-28.
134. Id. at 1228.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1241, 1249.
137. IND. CODE § 32-30-6-6 (2004) quoting City of Gary, 801 N.E.2d at 1229.
138. The statute does not expressly state that the conduct must be unreasonable. City of
Gary, 801 N.E.2d at 1229-30. The court reasoned, however, that because the language of the
statute is broad and potentially inclusive of activities that would not be actionable as nui-
sances, the legislature would have intended that an unreasonableness requirement be read
into the provision. Id. Moreover, the Indiana courts have always construed the statute as
including a reasonableness standard. Id.
139. Id. at 1231 (quoting City's complaint).
140. Id. at 1241.
141. Id. at 1231.
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the use of land, the court determined that previous applications
simply reflected the evolving history of the doctrine in the state,
not any specific legal requirements. Further, the court rejected
any need for an independent underlying tort. Noting that the City
did, in fact, allege a negligence claim distinct from the public nui-
sance claim, the court expressly stated, "a nuisance claim may be
predicated on a lawful activity conducted in such a manner that it
imposes costs on others."143 The court offered the following justifi-
cation for its ruling:
[T] he law of public nuisance is best viewed as shifting the re-
sulting cost from the general public to the party who creates
it. If the marketplace values the product sufficiently to accept
that cost, the manufacturer can price it into the product. If
the manufacturers and users of the offending activity con-
clude that the activity is not worthwhile after absorbing these
costs, that is their choice. In either case, there is no injustice
in requiring the activity to tailor itself to accept the costs im-
posed on others or cease generating them.
144
In examining the City's complaint, the court observed that exist-
ing gun regulations permit the defendants to nominally comply
with the law, but create a public nuisance through unreasonable
conduct that results in foreseeable harm. In any event, much of
the conduct alleged by the City was in violation of existing gun
regulations.
4 5
The City of Gary court also addressed the remedies available to
the City. The defendants argued that the City was barred by several• 146
statutes from bringing an action to abate a public nuisance. They
also argued that a state statute authorizing a municipal corpora-
tion to enjoin certain conduct was limited to the examples
addressed in the statute. 147 The court rejected all of the arguments,
choosing instead to read the statutes as lacking the intention to
142. Id. at 1232. The court also cited the Second Restatement, which states several cir-
cumstances that would constitute a public nuisance, only one of which is illegal conduct. Id.
at 1233 (referencing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977)). Nor does the Re-
statement limit the doctrine to activities involving real property. See id.
143. City of Gary, 801 N.E.2d at 1234.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1235.
146. Id. at 1238.
147. Id. at 1239.
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limit the circumstances under which the City could seek an injunc-
148tion.
The court also ruled that money damages may be available to
the City to reimburse it for public expenditures such as health care
expenses, emergency services, increased criminal ustice costs, and
reductions in tax revenues and property values. While the court
acknowledged that such damages may end up barred on proxi-
mate cause grounds, the allegations in the complaint were
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court stated: "This
is a conventional tort pleading subject to no requirement of speci-
ficity. What form the City's proof will take is currently not before
us and we cannot say as a matter of law it cannot establish some
items of damage if liability is proven."
1 51
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1240.
150. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court addressed the proximate cause problems as-
sociated with the City's claims for negligent distribution and design. Id. at 1243-44. The
court explicitly referenced this discussion of proximate cause in addressing the damages
issues for public nuisance, stating that the proximate cause discussion "applies equally" to
public nuisance damages. Id. at 1240. The court's holding on this issue reinforces our ar-
gument that the central role of public nuisance is the abatement of damages. If relief for
public nuisance is thus limited, the issue of proximate cause recedes, because the public
entity must be able to do whatever is needed to abate the nuisance and thereby protect the
safety of its citizens. When a prayer for damages that do not abate the nuisance is added,
public nuisance risks collapsing into other theories, and becomes ripe for arguments such
as those made by the defendants in this case. First, they argued that the City could not re-
cover for the damages alleged because they were "municipal costs incurred in the course of
ordinary governmental functions." Id. at 1242. The court rejected such a categorical bar,
stating that the question of what costs may be recoverable is a matter for case-by-case analy-
sis. Id. at 1243. Second, the defendants argued that the criminal's use of the gun in each
instance was a superseding cause of the harm. A substantial amount of time may pass be-
tween the defendant's actions and the criminal use of the gun. Id. at 1244. The court noted
some significant problems that the City faces in proving proximate cause for the purpose of
recovering the costs alleged. Id. The court stated:
A wide variety of intervening circumstances may contribute to the ultimate unlawful
use. And of course lawfully purchased handguns are also used in crimes, so any at-
tempt to recover costs attributable to unlawfully distributed weapons must address
that fact .... As a matter of law, in the absence of other facts, it is not a natural and
probable consequence of the lawful sale of a handgun that the weapon will be used
in a crime .... The City's general description of its damages would presumably em-
brace a vast number of different unspecified claims arising from a variety of widely
different circumstances.
Id. Despite the substantial problems of proof, the procedural posture of the case did not
permit the court to rule that money damages could not be recovered. Id. at 1245. Had pub-
lic nuisance been confined to its proper sphere, these complications could have been
avoided.
151. Id. at 1240. Because the court was discussing the request for damages at this point
in the opinion, it was appropriate to refer to the claim as based on tort law. Again, when it
comes to damages, the city is situated similarly to any private plaintiff.
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In a more succinct opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion in the earlier case of City of Cincinnati v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp.112 The defendants-fifteen handgun manufacturers,
three trade associations, and a distributor-raised the same argu-
ments seen in the cases previously discussed. Because the City had
included claims for strict product liability based upon design de-
fect and failure to warn, the court expressly addressed the
applicability of the public nuisance doctrine to situations involving
the design and manufacture of products. The court held that such
matters are within the scope of the public nuisance doctrine. '
The court also ruled that the defendants' compliance with the
regulatory scheme for distribution of firearms did not preclude the
City's claim for public nuisance, as the acts alleged involving the
illegal secondary market in guns were not specifically regulated by
law.
The City of Cincinnati court also addressed issues related to the
injuries alleged by the City. First, the court held that the injuries
claimed-interference with public rights for which an injunction
was sought and reimbursement for emergency, health, and crimi-• . 156
nal justice system expenses -- demonstrated a direct relation with57
the conduct alleged. Moreover, the injuries were direct expenses
incurred by the City itself.15 The court then considered three
other factors-whether the expenses would be difficult to prove;
whether there was a risk of double liability; and whether public
policy was served by allowing the action. 159 The expenses claimed
by the City passed scrutiny under all of these factors. The court
concluded that the expenses were easily calculated, and that no
152. 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002). On April 30, 2003, the Cincinnati City Council
voted to drop the city's lawsuit. The city's motion to do so was granted, without prejudice,
on May 14, 2003. Because the court's decision heralded a change in the outcome of public
nuisance suits, however, we discuss it here. See BRADY CENTER, REFORMING THE GUN INDUS-
TRY: CITY OF CINCINNATI V. BERETrA U.SA. CORP. (2004), available at http://
www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/cities/cityview.php?RecordNo=11 (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
153. See City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1145-47. The court held that the City's strict
product liability claims were barred by the Ohio Product Liability Act, which prevented
recovery solely for economic damages. Id. at 1146. Nevertheless, the court held that the City
stated a claim for negligent design defect and negligent failure to warn under Ohio com-
mon law, which did not limit the kinds of damages available. Id.
154. Id. at 1142.
155. Id. at 1143.
156. Id. at 1140.
157. Id. at 1148.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 1149 (deriving the factors from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision on
remoteness in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992)).
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other person would have standing to bring an action for the same
injuries against the defendants,- thus avoiding a risk of multiple
liability for the defendants.16' Further, the court held that the pub-
lic interest would be served by allowing the lawsuit, the purpose of
which was to secure public safety and health and also to reimburse
the City for direct harms it allegedly suffered."'
B. Suits by Private Plaintiffs
The suits described above generally represent a positive trend,
although confusion between the mission of public nuisance and
tort continues. Before these important rulings, courts had more
often dismissed public nuisance claims for reasons that frequently
betrayed a misunderstanding of the basic mission of the doctrine.
But these recent advances could be stanched by an unlikely
source-success by private plaintiffs in claims for public nuisance.
As stated earlier, the private suit for public nuisance serves no use-
ful or justifiable purpose and may be contributing to the needless
confusion surrounding the doctrine. The two decisions discussed
below are instructive in different ways. 63
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Ileto v. Glock Inc., reinstating
the plaintiffs' claims for public nuisance and negligence, actually
demonstrates that culpable conduct by gun sellers can be handled
through a garden-variety negligence suit, without resorting to pub-
lic nuisance. And the magisterial decision by Judge Weinstein in
164 gNAACP v. Acusport, Inc., establishing the defendants' role in cre-
ating a public nuisance-but denying recovery because of the
plaintiffs' inability to show an injury different in kind from that
suffered by the general public-underscores the strength of paral-
lel efforts by public governmental entities to abate public
nuisances. The courts' decisions are discussed below, while analysis
160. Id.
161. The court referred to this factor as the risk of "double recovery," but the concern
is more appropriately characterized as one of double or multiple liability on the part of the
defendants. No danger existed that the City might have a double recovery. Rather, the ques-
tion the court seemed to address was whether, if the City recovered for these expenses,
private citizens or other parties might be able to recover for the same elements of damages.
This clearly could not happen. But the City's claim for damages under public nuisance
should be granted only to the extent that such damages contribute to abatement.
162. City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1149. This Article has already discussed the prob-
lem with allowing costs that do not abate the nuisance. See notes 56-59 and accompanying
text.
163. 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
164. 271 E Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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of the broader implications of these holdings is deferred until Part
IV.
In November 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed a lower-court dismissal of public nuisance
and other claims brought by private plaintiffs against gun industry
defendants in Ileto v. Glock Inc. The Ninth Circuit reinstated
claims for negligence and public nuisance brought by the estate of
a United States Postal worker who was killed and the representa-
tives of three young children who were injured in a 1999 shooting• . ° 166
spree in California. At the time of these events, the shooter had
been subject to a federal law that prohibited him from purchasing,
possessing, or using firearms. 16 Nevertheless, he had purchased
the guns in his possession-a collection of handguns and rifles-
through the secondary market."8
The plaintiffs in Ileto focused their public nuisance claim on the
marketing, distribution, and sale of the defendants' firearms. In
particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant gun sellers
knew of a secondary market in their products that catered to,
among others, persons prohibited by federal law from purchasing
guns, and that they should have made an effort to conduct their
marketing and distribution practices so as to restrict access by such
prohibited purchasers.169 Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the
165. 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
166. Id. at 1194.
167. Id at 1195 n.4. Prior to purchasing the guns used in these shootings, the shooter
had been confined to a psychiatric hospital, indicted on a felony charge, and convicted of
second-degree assault. Id. The federal Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act prohibits
the sale of any firearms to a person who "has been committed to any mental institution
.... 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (4) (2004), or who is under indictment for, or has been convicted
in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, id.
§ 922(d)'(1).
168. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1197. Federal law provides no regulation for the secondary gun
market. See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text. The Brady Act contains some re-
quirements directed at gun transfers, but a gun is unregulated by the Act once it leaves the
hands of a licensed dealer. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (3), (5) (2004). The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") has some narrow authority over firearms, but has no gen-
eral authority to regulate the purchase, transport, or use of guns in the United States. See 27
C.F.R. § 47, 53 (2003) (circumscribing BATF's authority over guns to certain licensing activi-
ties, taxing, and exports). Likewise, the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC")
has no authority over firearms. Congress has expressly excluded firearms from the jurisdic-
tion of the CPSC. Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-284, § 3(e), 90 Stat. 503, 504 (1976) (stating that the CPSC "shall make no ruling or
order that restricts the manufacture or sale of firearms"). State laws also fail to regulate or
restrict the secondary gun market. See generally Eggen & Culhane, Gun Torts, supra note 8, at
130-32 (describing state regulation of firearms, which does not extend to the secondary
market).
169. Ileto, 349 E3d at 1198. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged:" 'The par-.
ticular firearms used in these incidents were marketed, distributed, imported, promoted,
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defendants "'knowingly establish[ed], suppl[ied], and main-
tain[ed] an over-saturated firearms market that facilitates easy
access for criminal purposes, including access by persons prohib-
ited to purchase or possess firearms under state or federal law.' ,,9170
These activities, the plaintiffs alleged, constituted a public nui-
sance by interfering with the public safety, health, and peace in a
manner that "'adversely affects the fabric and viability of the entire
community.' ,,71
The Ileto court first held that the plaintiffs met the "special in-
jury" test to allow them, as private citizens, to bring a public
nuisance claim. Relying on the statement of public nuisance doc-
trine in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which had been adopted
by the California Supreme Court,13 the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had met the pleading requirements for a public nuisance
claim because they had suffered injuries different in kind, not
merely in degree, from other members of the general public. 4
The court characterized the specific traumatic physical injuries
and mental shock of the plaintiffs as different in kind from the
more generalized fear and inconvenience suffered by the general
public as a result of the defendants' conduct.
175
Further, the court determined that the defendants' acts as al-
leged by the plaintiffs in support of their public nuisance claim
created a question of fact from which a reasonable jury could con-
clude that the defendants' actions were the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries. 176 Defendant Glock had asserted that proximate
cause in a nuisance action is dependent upon the gun seller having
control over the gun at the time of the shootings, which was clearly
not the case.' The Ninth Circuit, as had the district court before
it, concluded that California law does not require control and that
the California Supreme Court, if given the opportunity, would
merely require a showing of proximate cause. 71Proximate cause,
the court further concluded, was sufficiently stated in the amended
and sold by defendants in a manner ... which defendants knew or should have known fa-
cilitates and encourages easy access by persons intent on murder, mayhem, or other crimes,
including illegal purchasers....... Id. (quoting plaintiffs' first amended complaint).
170. Id. (quoting plaintiffs' first amended complaint).
171. Id. at 1199 (quoting plaintiffs' first amended complaint).
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, C (1979).
173. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1209-10 (citing People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604
(Cal. 1997)).
174. Id. at 1212.
175. Id. One of the plaintiffs, a minor, suffered no physical injuries, but was mentally
and emotionally traumatized by the incident.
176. Id. at 1212-13.
177. Id. at 1212.
178. Id.
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complaint through allegations that the defendants' actions fore-
seeably resulted in the creation of a secondary gun market that
made guns available to prohibited purchasers such as the shooter
in this case.79
The Ninth Circuit then turned its attention to the scope of public
nuisance doctrine in California. The district court had held that a
valid claim for nuisance must be associated with property; thus,
because this case involved a non-property matter, the action must be
dismissed. 18 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit concluded that California181
does recognize nuisance claims unassociated with property. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court noted, expressly states that
"[u]nlike a private nuisance, a public nuisance does not necessarily
involve interference with use and enjoyment of land. 182 In a related
argument, the defendant asserted that the activities of legal,
regulated industries were not valid subjects of a public nuisance
claim. The court rejected this argument as well, finding that the
facts alleged by the plaintiffs in their complaint presented a
situation uniquely suited to public nuisance. The court stated:
"[A]lthough gun manufacturing is legal and the sale of guns is
regulated by state and federal law, the distribution and marketing
of guns in a way that creates and contributes to a danger to the
public generally and to the plaintiffs in particular is not permitted
under law."'8 3 The plaintiffs' public nuisance claims were not based
on the legal manufacture and sale of guns, the court observed, but
on the specific acts of the defendants that led to the creation and
maintenance of an illegal secondary gun market.184 The plaintiffs
further alleged that the defendants knew or should have known
that their promotion and sales activities would make their guns
available to persons such as the shooter in this case and that they
might be used illegally in the manner alleged by the injuredS 185
plaintiffs. The court concluded that these factual allegations fell
within the doctrine of public nuisance as described in the Second
Restatement and recognized by the California Supreme Court.
179. Id.
180. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1058-59 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that
nuisance cases usually involve property, not products, and concluding that "[p]laintiffs may
not state a public nuisance claim for the distribution of firearms").
181. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1213-14.
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. h (1979).
183. Jleto, 349 E3d at 1214-15.
184. Id. at 1214.
185. Id. at 1215.
186. Id. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit dissenter cited a California case
that expressly stated, "[N]uisance cases 'universally' concern the use or condition of
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In another case brought by private citizens against the gun
industry, a federal district court in New York held that New York law
recognized the applicability of public nuisance to the activities of
gun sellers. In NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., ' the NAACP alleged that its
members were disproportionately affected by gun violence resulting
from the conduct of the Fun industry in marketing, promoting, and
selling their products. While the court determined that the
activities of the gun sellers met the definition of a public nuisance,
ultimately the court dismissed the NAACP's public nuisance claim
on the ground that the NAACP did not suffer a harm different in
kind from the harm suffered by the general public as a result of
the defendants' activities."'
The Acusport court recognized that a wide variety of activities fall
within the definition of public nuisance in New York. Under the
district court's analysis of New York law, a public nuisance is cre-
ated "when the health, safety, or comfort of a considerable
number of persons . .. is endangered or injured, or interference
with the use by the public of a public place ... occurs." 9 ° This
definition is sufficiently broad to extend the doctrine beyond ac-
tivities traditionally associated with the land. Several factors enter
into the determination of whether the interference is substantial.
These factors include the nature and degree of the harm, the na-
property, not products." City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876 (Cal.
App. 1994) (alteration in original); see Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1223 (Hall, J., dissenting); Ileto, 194
F. Supp. 2d at 1058-59. The Ninth Circuit found it significant that this interpretation was
expressed only in a decade-old intermediate appellate court decision and that the
California Supreme Court had not ruled on the issue. More important than this isolated
case, the Ninth Circuit opined, was the California Supreme Court's espousal of the Second
Restatement's broad definition and application of public nuisance. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1214
n.30. The court also distinguished City of San Diego on the ground that that case was a
traditional product liability action brought in the "guise" of a public nuisance claim,
whereas the allegations presented in Iletowere of an entirely different nature. Id. n.29.
187. 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
188. Id. at 446-47.
189. The court stated that "the extensive and severe harm proven by plaintiff to be suf-
fered by the NAACP, its members, and the African-American community in the state of New
York is not 'different in kind' .... " Id. at 499. Thus, the court had no need to consider
which persons were to be considered members of the NAACP for the purpose of being
represented in the action. Id. The court also stated: "African-Americans do suffer greater
harm from illegal handguns for complex socioeconomic and historical reasons. But to say
that they suffer a greater amount of harm is not enough under New York law." Id. Instead,
the plaintiff was required to show harm of a different kind from that suffered by the general
public. See id. at 497. The defendants have filed an appeal to the Second Circuit in the Acus-
port case, notwithstanding their win. Alison Frankel, Sore Winners, AMERICAN LAWYER, Jan.
2004. The defendants will seek to have the court's findings of fact vacated as not being es-
sential to the judgment. The defendants apparently are concerned that the City of New York
will attempt to make use of the findings, through collateral estoppel, in its similar suit
against the gun industry. Id.
190. NAACP, 271 F. Supp.2d at 484.
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ture of the interference, whether the defendants' activities are ille-
gal or are expressly permitted by statute, the duration of the
activities and/or harm, and whether the risk of harm to the public
could be minimized.' 9' In essence, the interference "must be real
and appreciable, not imagined or petty.'
92
The main issue raised by the defendants in Acusport was that the
promotion and sales of guns in New York is lawful. The defendants
argued that their activities were legal and did not constitute a pub-
lic nuisance. 9 The court stated that the legality of the defendants'
activities is one factor in determining whether they constitute a
public nuisance. More important, however, is the manner in which
the defendant conducts its business. The manner or circumstances
of the defendants' otherwise legal activities could be considered a
public nuisance where there is an interference with a public
right.194 The fact that the defendants' industry is regulated does not
immunize the defendants from a suit in public nuisance.19 With
respect to the allegations in the complaint, the court noted that
"the particular marketing and distribution practices engaged in by
defendant manufacturers and distributors remain almost wholly
unregulated, ' '196 thus rendering irrelevant the regulated nature of
the industry in general. Moreover, the court noted, the New York
criminal statutes expressly declare the unlawful possession and use
of guns to be a nuisance.
The Acusport court then concerned itself-in more detail than
any other court previously had-with the underlying conduct that
constituted the public nuisance. The gun sellers, according to es-
tablished law, must have either intentionally or negligently caused.... . 198
or contributed to the interference with a public right. The court
focused most of its discussion on determining whether the defen-
dants' conduct could be characterized as negligent. In holding
that the defendants had a duty to members of the public, the court
191. Id. The court noted that all factors should be evaluated in deciding whether the
interference is substantial. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 447.
194. Id. at 484.
195. Id. at 485.
196. Id.
197. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05(1) (McKinney 2002) (stating that a weapon, "when
unlawfully possessed, manufactured, transported or disposed of, or when utilized in the
commission of an offense, is hereby declared a nuisance").
198. Acusport, 271 E Supp. 2d at 487. The underlying conduct could also constitute an
abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity, but under the circumstances presented in
the case, the court determined that negligent and intentional conduct were the only op-
tions. Id.
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was careful to point out that duty for public nuisance purposes is
different from duty in a negligence action:
[T]he burden on a private plaintiff seeking to abate a public
nuisance ... does not include showing, where the nuisance is
based on negligence, that the defendant owes a particular in-
jured person, as opposed to the public, a duty of care. At issue
in a public nuisance action is a duty of care to the public or to
a substantial number of persons.199
The court clarified this reasoning by distinguishing Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,"'0 an earlier case against the gun industry also
governed by New York law, but involving a negligent marketing
claim. One of the questions certified by the Second Circuit to the
New York Court of Appeals in Hamilton had been whether the de-
fendant gun manufacturers owed a duty of care to the private
211plaintiffs in the marketing and distribution of their handguns.
The Court of Appeals concluded that no such duty existed, stating
that "[fjoreseeability, alone, does not define duty., 202 The Court of
Appeals left open the possibility that a duty could be found in a
case with sufficient proof that the negligent marketing itself caused
the injuries alleged. °0
The Acusport court focused on certain statements made by the
Hamilton court, which defined the parameters of gun manufac-
turer duty. The Hamilton court had stated that duty requires a
"'tangible showing that defendants were a direct link in the causal
chain that resulted in plaintiffs' injuries and ... defendants were
realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs.' ,204 The Hamilton
court explained that gun suppliers that deal with retailers who en-
gage in dangerous sales practices-and where the suppliers know
or reasonably could know of those practices-could have a duty to
refrain from such dealings, or be subject to liability. The plain-tiffs in Hamilton did not offer such evidence. In contrast to
199. Id. at 490. That the court couched its analysis in the language of duty points out
the opportunity for confusion between public nuisance and the tort of negligence.
200. 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001). Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of
New York presided over the jury trial in Hamilton on the plaintiffs' negligent marketing
claims against gun-industry defendants. The trial resulted in an award of damages against
three of the gun manufacturers. Id. at 1059. Judge Weinstein wrote the opinion for the
court in the Acusport case discussed here in the text.
201. Id. at 1059.
202. Id. at 1060.
203. See id. at 1062.
204. Acusport, 271 E Supp. 2d at 491 (quoting Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1062).
205. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1062.
[VOL. 38:1
Public Nuisance Claims Against Gun Sellers
Hamilton, which involved individual plaintiffs' claims of negligent
marketing and entrustment, the Acusport case sought recovery for
danger to the public. The Acusport court held that the plaintiff
pleaded sufficient-and indeed exhaustive-facts supporting the
existence of a duty owed by the defendants. These facts included
statistical information on the existence of an illegal secondary
market in guns based upon tracing reports issued by BATF and
other sources, including information available from the defendant
206gun manufacturers.
The court also addressed the causation issues presented by the
case. Regarding cause in fact, the court analogized this situation to
the textbook case of multiple tortfeasors whose independent ac-
tions combine to create a single injurious result.0 7 The court held
that, on this basis, all of the defendants could be ordered to abate
2081the nuisance. Moreover, the multiple actors could be held liable
for public nuisance notwithstanding the intervening criminal act
that caused harms of which the plaintiff complained. The court
stated that "a defendant may be held liable for setting in motion or
being a force in a chain of events resulting in injury to the pub-
lic." 20 On the matter of proximate cause, the court emphasized
that in public nuisance actions, limitations on causation should be
210
"less restrictive" than in other suits brought by individuals.
IV. ASSESSING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC NUISANCE
SUITS AGAINST GUN SELLERS
We have discussed in an earlier article the various kinds of
actions (and inactions) alleged to constitute public nuisances by
gun sellers and argued that the claim involving the creation of
illegal secondary markets "most closely fits the goals of public
• ,211
nuisance." The preceding section makes clear that the case law
has now begun to coalesce around this central thesis. But further
206. See Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 501-19. The court's factual findings were extensive.
207. The court instanced the situation of multiple defendants discharging waste into a
stream, collectively causing significant pollution. Id. at 493.
208. Id. The court noted that "contributions differ[ent] in kind or in degree [among
the tortfeasors] does not change the equation." Id.
209. Id. at 494.
210. Id. at 496. "The boundary will be extended as the dangers to be protected against
increase." Id. at 497.
211. Culhane & Eggen, Public Nuisance, supra note 16, at 316.
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questions arise regarding the scope of these actions, as well as the
advisable course of action for plaintiffs.
A. Proper Pleading of the Public Nuisance Claim
As courts begin to allow proper public nuisance claims to be
brought against the gun industry, one important question is the
type and extent of claim pleading that plaintiffs must make to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss. In the cases recognizing the public
nuisance claims, the complaints varied significantly, from those
containing broad and general allegations to those setting forth
specific facts and practices. These cases suggest that formal rules of
notice pleading may be less important than the need to articulate
the course of conduct and the relationship between the primary
market and the secondary market in firearms.
Under modern rules of pleading, plaintiffs ordinarily need not
provide details in the complaint, plead evidence, or otherwise pack
the complaint with factual allegations so long as the information
contained in the complaint places the defendant on sufficient no-
tice of the claims against it. The complaint in City of Cincinnati v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp. apparently fit this more relaxed requirement
perfectly. As described by the Ohio Supreme Court, Cincinnati's
complaint simply charged defendant gun manufacturers and sell-
ers with conduct causing "handguns to be used and possessed
illegally".214
As procedurally correct as such pleadings may be, there seems
to be greater value in more specific allegations. As between the
complaints in City of Gary and City of Cincinnati, on the one hand,
and the second amended complaint in City of Chicago and the pri-
vate plaintiffs' complaint in Acusport on the other, the latter are
preferable. While the City of Gary court is accurate in its statement
that modern pleadings generally are "subject to no requirement of
specificity,"21" the kind of detail contained in the City of Chicago and
Acusport complaints is more desirable in public nuisance cases be-
212. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (stating that the "Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases
his claim"); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2) (the complaint shall contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,") and 8(e) (1) (all averments in a
pleading shall be "simple, concise, and direct"); RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 32-41 (8th ed. 2003).
213. 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
214. Id. at 1141.
215. Id.
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cause the power of public nuisance law and its corresponding po-
tential for abuse understandably make courts wary. Thus,
complaints that reflect pre-filing investigation into the defendants'
conduct in contributing to the illegal sales and trafficking of guns
are likelier, as a practical matter, to commend themselves to
courts. The City of Chicago complaint, for example, presents a long
string of allegations that clearly set forth the plaintiffs' theory re-
garding the gun manufacturers' role in facilitating the movement
of guns into the secondary market and, ultimately, into the hands
of criminals.216
A recent federal court case demonstrates the important role of
careful pleading in public nuisance claims. In Johnson v. Bryco
Arms, 217 Judge Weinstein, in the wake of his ruling in Acusport, al-
218
lowed a victim's private claim for public nuisance to go forward.
Noting that the same court had dismissed an earlier claim by a vic-
tim against gun manufacturers and distributors,1 9 Judge Weinstein
distinguished that earlier case on the basis of specific factual in-
formation. He explained that because the gun in the earlier case
had never been recovered, the plaintiff was forced to name all de-
fendants who produced or sold .38 caliber semiautomatic pistols.
22 °
As a result, the plaintiff was not able to make a connection between
the special injuries suffered and the defendants. In contrast, the
plaintiff's allegations in Johnson v. Bryco Arms stated not only that the
gun had been recovered, but also traced the path of possession of
216. For example, paragraph 64 of the second amended complaint stated: "'The de-
fendant gun manufacturers and distributors distribute quantities of their firearms through
low-end retailers such as pawn shops and gun stores that are known to be frequented by
criminals and gang members.'" City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 21 (111.
App. Ct. 2002), rev'd, 2004 Ill. LEXIS 1665 (Nov. 18, 2004). In reversing the appellate court's
decision, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that Illinois was a fact-pleading jurisdiction.
Accordingly, pleadings were subject to a higher standard of review than those in Ohio,
which requires only notice-pleading. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2004 Ill. LEXIS
1665 (Nov. 18, 2004). Even under this strict standard, the court noted, the allegations of
misconduct against the dealers were detailed. Id. at *24. The allegations against other de-
fendants were comparatively "sparse," id., but the court did not decide the case on that
issue.
217. 304 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
218. As detailed in the discussion of the private claims for public nuisance, see infra Part
IlI.B, this Article takes the view that personal injury claims are better suited to other tort
theories, and that public nuisance should be left to municipal and state efforts to safeguard
their citizens. The discussion of Johnson in the text makes the broader point that more spe-
cific allegations are likelier to engender favorable judicial treatment, whatever the identity
of the plaintiff.
219. 304 E Supp. 2d at 391 (referencing Johnson v. Beemiller, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12420 (E.D.N.YJuly 21,2003)).
220. Id. at 391-92.
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the gun.221 Citing Ileto, the court allowed the public nuisance claim
222to withstand the defendants' motion to dismiss. The allegations
in the Johnson complaint set forth significant information on which
the court's ruling turned.S223
As previously discussed, public nuisance claims brought by
public entities do not have the same problems as private claims for
public nuisance, such as Johnson. More generalized pleading may
be sufficient to state a claim by a public entity. But Johnson still
provides a valuable pleading lesson. Complaints like that in City of
Chicago set a high standard, but in recommending it, we do not sug-
gest that dismissal is warranted in cases involving less specific
allegations. The numerous and highly detailed descriptions of mis-
conduct by gun sellers add valuable credibility to cities' assertions
that their primary interest is in protecting the public safety of their
residents. Over the course of some sixty-six pages, the Chicago com-
plaint set forth instance after instance of specific misconduct by
manufacturers, distributors, and especially dealers. Through the
City's "sting" operation, undercover police officers were able to un-
cover a host of illegal practices, the most serious of which were
dealers' ignoring statements revealing an undercover purchaser's
stated intent to use the weapon for an illegal purpose, and actual
facilitation of a buyer's illegal purposes by such conduct as "revis-
224ing" purchase orders and encouraging illegal straw purchases.
The response to these allegations by the lower court, which had
dismissed the complaint, unwittingly exposed the fallacy of the de-
fendants' "guns are already regulated" argument. The trial judge
took the position that the City should rely on the criminal laws in
existence instead of suing for public nuisance. But one reason for
public nuisance claims is that abatement of the nuisance can
achieve a broader protection of the public's safety than law en-
forcement efforts, which are often only possible after injury has
occurred. The "sting" can't be used everywhere. In our view, the
Chicago complaint sets the standard for public nuisance claims
against gun sellers.
221. See id. at 389-90.
222. Id. at 392.
223. See supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
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B. The Continuing Mismatch of Private
Plaintiffs and Public Nuisance
Although the Acusport case was ultimately unsuccessful, well-
pleaded complaints allowed the two private actions for public nui-
sance discussed in Part III to advance beyond the pleading stage.
Inasmuch as the federal courts were interpreting state laws that
follow the universal rule allowing private actions for public nui-
sance, it is neither surprising nor objectionable that they were
allowed to proceed. Taken together, though, Ileto and Acusport un-
derscore the point that public nuisance is better left to
governmental entities in their efforts to safeguard public health.
Further, requiring private suits to proceed on a different theory,
such as negligence or product liability, can reinforce the point that
gun seller misconduct causes both public and private injury, and
that these categories of injuries, as well as the recovery appropriate
to each, are quite distinct from each other.
If ultimately proven, the conduct in Ileto could establish that
the defendants had acted negligently, or perhaps even recklessly
within the Restatement's definition: "A person acts with reckless-
ness ... if the person knows of the risk of harm created by
[certain] conduct or knows facts that make that risk obvious
,,226
.... If reckless conduct were indeed proven, punitive damages
221
would be appropriate. Public nuisance cases brought by govern-
mental bodies, by contrast, should require no such showing of
fault. This rule follows from the "office" of public nuisance,
which concerns itself with the effect of the nuisance-not with the
conduct itself.
229
225. See supra notes 163-86 and accompanying text.
226. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCI-
PLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) § 2(a).
227. Id. § 2 cmt. b ("[T] he standard for awarding punitive damages commonly refers to
the defendant's reckless conduct").
228. See Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Rediscovering the Common
Law (Part 1), 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,292, 10,299 (Oct. 1986) ("[Strict liability] applies cate-
gorically only to public nuisance actions brought by the sovereign pursuant to the police
power.").
229. It is nonetheless true that public nuisance claims against gun sellers all allege cul-
pable conduct. These allegations are consistent with the claims' basic underpinnings-that
the sellers allow the illegal secondary market to flourish. In other cases of public nuisance,
however, the state may seek abatement even in the absence of fault. Requiring the cleanup
of a toxic spill would be appropriate even if the railroad car carrying the toxin were de-
railed through no one's fault, and even if transporting hazardous materials via rail were not
considered to fall within the definition of abnormally dangerous activity. Cf. Indiana Harbor
Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to impose
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Setting forth the conduct that gives rise to the public nuisance
might be a useful way of focusing the court's attention on the per-
tinent facts in a private suit for damages, but this goal could be
achieved without recognizing a private claim for public nuisance as
a separate cause of action. A court might use the allegations stated
in support of a public nuisance claim to establish the defendant's
duty to the private plaintiff in a negligence claim. But negligence,
and not public nuisance, should ground such a lawsuit.
In addition to culpable conduct, the private plaintiff needs to
show the requisite causal connection between conduct and in-
jury-and there is no call for relaxing the causal showing in the
private claim, as there would be in the sovereign's public nuisanceS 230 ..
claim. In short, the public nuisance claim is not necessary to the
plaintiff's success in Ileto; it serves instead as a kind of alloy to
strengthen the case already pleaded. Although such reinforcement
is doubtless useful to the plaintiff, the claim would neither depend
on public nuisance nor gain from the relaxed requirements avail-
able to the state-actor plaintiff.
The Ileto case also reminds us that tort plaintiffs typically seek
money damages. In contrast, the state or municipal plaintiff in a
public nuisance claim ordinarily seeks abatement of the nuisance.
While many of the municipal complaints also seek damages, such
damages are appropriate only to the extent that they discharge the
state's responsibility for safeguarding the public's safety and wel-
fare. When "public nuisance" is used to describe both a tort and an
exercise of the police power, though, it is too easy for courts to
elide the distinctions between them and misconstrue as a tort what
should be a straightforward exercise of the police power. Damages
might therefore be awarded whether or not they play any role in
abating the nuisance. The confusion is exacerbated by the possibil-
231ity of the state's suing in its proprietary capacity. In that event,
strict liability on a defendant who transported dangerous chemicals via rail). Under such
circumstances, the private plaintiff injured would have no public nuisance claim, but the
state would.
230. Indeed, the lleto court cross-referenced its discussion of proximate cause in the
section on negligence when analyzing the private plaintiffs' public nuisance claim, indicat-
ing that the court deemed this element to be a necessary component in both claims. Ileto v.
Glock Inc., 349 E3d 1191, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2003). See also supra notes 176-79 and accom-
panying text.
231. In Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 117 (Conn. 2001), the court dis-
missed the public nuisance claim because it was not brought in the state's role as parens
patriae. The failure by the City of Bridgeport to sue in this representative capacity was unfor-
tunate because the complaint did allege a public nuisance that could have been abated (or
at least reduced) had the case proceeded to trial. In addition to the money damages sought
for the cost to the city of gun violence, the plaintiffs had alleged that the conduct would
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tort is the proper vehicle, and damages will usually be both the re-
quested and proper remedy. This possibility only underscores the
virtue of removing public nuisance from the realm of "tort" alto-
gether. If that were done, the state could sue in public nuisance for
abatement of the nuisance and in a separate cause of action sound-
ing in a recognized theory of tort law for the damage to property
that it owns or, within the strict limits of tort doctrine, for eco-
nomic loss. In that situation, the state would be suing in two
distinct capacities, and the outcomes could well differ.
Acusport makes an even stronger case for limiting public nui-
sance to its proper sphere. The findings of fact proving certain
defendants' contributions to the illegal secondary market 232 were
so devastating against certain gun sellers that they sought to appeal
the judgment, even though they won the case. The defendants'
concern is understandable. New York City is the plaintiff in an-
other gun suit pending before Judge Weinstein, the author of the
Acusport decision.234 Even though he has stated that he will not give235
collateral estoppel effect to the findings in the Acusport case, the
course of tobacco litigation clearly showed the corrosive effect of
236damning discovery on subsequent cases.
One of the factors that drove the court's decision in City of Cin-
cinnati-that no one besides the city would have standing to sue
for the kind of harm the city alleged-impelled the court in pre-
cisely the other direction in Acusport. For the societal harms gun
violence causes, a public entity, and not the NAACP-or any other
private entity-is the competent party to bring a public nuisance
claim because the state or city sues in its parens patriae capacity, on
behalf of its citizens. Private groups or private citizens do not have
this authority. This point surfaced in a dramatic fashion in Acus-
port, because a membership organization is highly unlikely to be
able to demonstrate the kind of particular harm that private tort
"continue to threaten the health, safety and welfare of the residents of Bridgeport." Id. at
115.
232. NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 501-08 (E.D.N.Y 2003) (articulating
extensive findings of fact regarding the secondary market in firearms).
233. Alison Frankel, Sore Winners, AMERICAN LAWYER, Jan. 2004, (discussing defendants'
plan to ask the appellate court to vacate the findings of fact "on the grounds that they were
not necessary to his final judgment.").
234. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp.2d 256 (E.D.N.Y 2004). It is
significant that the complaint, which originally requested damages, now seeks only injunc-
tive relief to abate the nuisance created by gun violence. New York v. Arms Technology, Inc.
(E.D.N.Y) (No. 00-CV-3641) (second amended complaint filedJan. 13, 2004).
235. See LeighJones, Top Cases of 2003, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 23, 2004, at m15.
236. See Gordon Fairclough, Tobacco Firms Ordered to Pay Ex-Smoker, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2000, at A3.
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claims for public nuisance require. The NAACP's case failed for
exactly this reason. But the generalized showing of harm that the
organization did make will likely anchor future suits brought by
municipal entities, and not only in New York City. Given the net-
work of manufacturing, distribution, and retail gun sales, the
findings of the Acusport court are likely to have a far-reaching im-
pact. The individualized harm that is the raw material of tort law
was lacking, however, and the case failed for that reason.
In an important way, Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.237 is a mirror-
image of Acusport. In Ganim, the City of Bridgeport, Connecticut,
and its mayor sued for public nuisance but sought to recover dam-
ages for particular injuries that it had allegedly suffered as a result
of the gun defendants' conduct. Because the city was not suing as a
representative of the city's populace under the parens patriae doc-238
trine, the court held that the injuries alleged were too remote
from the defendants' alleged conduct.3 9 Thus, the court's decision
in Ganim implicitly supports our view that the central mission of
public nuisance is the vindication of the public's right to be free
from substantial threats to, and interferences with, health and
safety. When public plaintiffs venture beyond the core remedy of
abatement, they risk dismissal of their claims.
In sum, Acusport reads like a municipal suit for public nuisance
brought by the wrong entity. In addition to the impossibility of
proving injury to its members different in kind from that suffered
by the public, the remedy that the court thought would have been
appropriate also reflects a "pure" public health claim, not a claim
based in tort. The court noted that the problem of multiple tort-
feasors makes recovery for damages against any one of them
problematic. But while it might be impossible to separate out acts
done by any one defendant and declare them a "substantial inter-
ference" with the public's rights, "an equitable action ... to abate
. .. 
.i bl ton..4oabt
the nuisance will lie against them all. In its own public nuisance
suit, the City of New York awaits its opportunity to convince the
court that the rights of its citizens have suffered such "substantial
interference" from the conduct of gun sellers.
The city cases discussed above represent a salutary trend in the
law of public nuisance, which remains a powerful and important
legal doctrine. Modern society is filled with mass-marketed dangers
that cause unreasonable interferences with the public health,
237. 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001).
238. Id.at 117.
239. Id. at 118-30.
240. NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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safety, and welfare, and public nuisance is the logical and ideal
doctrine with which to address those public hazards. The recent
public nuisance cases are also about pleading, and provide a useful
lesson for plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to articulate public nuisance
claims against the gun industry, whether their clients are public
entities or private citizens. The private complaints are strong on
their merits, but would better have been brought under another
theory, as in Ileto-in which other theories were also alleged-or,
as in Acusport, by a different entity. The ill fit of these cases to pub-
lic nuisance highlights the strength and special mission of the
doctrine.
V. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY EFFORTS
This Article has demonstrated that courts are beginning to ac-
knowledge the important role that public nuisance claims brought
by the state and its constituent cities can play in abating the
scourge of gun violence. But this very success, as well as the limited
advances made through private litigation, have spawned a disturb-
ing development: legislative initiatives and enactments, on both
the federal and state levels, that provide immunity from at least
some lawsuits brought against the gun industry. In general, these
statutes are unwarranted incursions into both the proper sphere of
the judiciary and the discretion of state executives to seek abate-
ment of gun violence. This type of federal legislation would rule
out many gun lawsuits-even those pending-while the state laws
are, with minor exceptions, a grab-bag of legislative giveaways to
the gun industry. Even though existing regulation does nothing to
reach the vast unregulated secondary market, and manufacturers
and dealers are well aware of the likelihood that many of their241
guns will end up in the hands of criminals through that route, an
increasing number of states are apparently willing to bear those
costs to placate the gun lobby.
The discussion below begins with an analysis of the recently de-
feated federal legislation that would have become the first
nationwide law to exempt a specific industry from vast swaths of
242liability. The Article then discusses a few of the growing number
241. See supra Part II.
242. Even though the bill's chief sponsor was pessimistic about its chances for recon-
sideration in an election year, see Stolberg, supra note 1, the gun lobby's demonstrated
power over Congress makes likely the reappearance of the bill, or something quite like it, in
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of state laws and proposals that offer various-and mostly unwar-
ranted-legal immunities to the gun industry. To the extent that
these initiatives choke off recovery for injury that would be justi-
fied under unexceptionable principles of tort law, or divest
government of its ability to abate gun violence, they are indefensi-
ble. The fear that drives their enactment indirectly supports the
argument, increasingly recognized by appellate courts, that nui-
sance abatement actions are an apt vehicle for dealing with the
threat to public safety presented by the illegal secondary market in
guns.
A. Federal Legislation
In 2003, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to
provide gun sellers significant immunity from civil suits.243 The bill
was passed by a large margin that same year, 44 but its counterpart
in the Senate 5 encountered significant opposition and was ulti-
246
mately defeated. The proposed legislation used broad language,
claiming that it was intended to "prohibit causes of action against
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or
ammunition products for the harm caused by the criminal or
unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by
others when the product functioned as designed and intended."
2 47
Congress sought to justify the use of such broad language by in-
cluding an expansive "findings" section that contained various
incorrect or misleading statements about the industry and the at-
tempts of cities and individuals to use the legal system for redress.
These so-called "findings" supported a pro-industry agenda by de-
claring gun rights that do not exist, mischaracterizing the industry
as blameless, and demeaning the long-standing role of litigation in
American society. Indeed, the statements in this section more
the near future. Compensation schemes, even though they typically restrict tort claims, are
quite different. See infra note 269.
243. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003).
244. See Chris Cox, Political Report, available at http://www.nraila.org (statement by Ex-
ecutive Director of NRA praising House passage of bill by vote of 285 to 140 and noting that
White House supported the bill) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
245. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003).
246. Senate Votes Down Gun Bill, Mar. 2, 2004, at http://cnn.com (on file with the Uni-
versity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
247. S. 659 108th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (1997).
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properly fell into the category of "arguments" than that of "find-
ings."
One stated "finding" was that "[c] itizens have a right, protected
by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, to
keep and bear arms.2 14 The United States Supreme Court has de-
cided only a few cases involving the Second Amendment, but it is
clear from those cases that the right is qualified and that both the
federal government and the states may imfpose limitations control-
ling the distribution and use of firearms. Another "finding" set
forth in the bill stated that the "[t]he manufacture, importation,
possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the
United States are heavily regulated by Federal, State, and local,,2 251
laws."2 0 As demonstrated elsewhere in this Article, the regulation
is far from "heavy," and, indeed, is completely inadequate in many
areas. That the industry may perceive any amount of regulation as
too heavy does not create a valid basis for federal legislation to
immunize sellers.
The section also referred to the "possibility of imposing liability
on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by others.
This statement incorrectly characterizes the lawsuits that have been
filed against gun sellers, which target practices in the industry thatare nreaonabe orn glgent253g
are unreasonable or negligent. Further, the bill stated that "li-
ability actions ... are based on theories without foundation in
hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of the
United States and do not represent a bona fide expansion of the
248. Id. § 2(a)(1). Gun industry advocates have long characterized the Second Amend-
ment right in these absolute terms.
249. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the federal gov-
ernment has the right to regulate firearms); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 539 (1894)
(holding that a statute prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons did not violate the
Second Amendment); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (upholding a state law
forbidding unauthorized military groups from parading with firearms). Although the Bush
Justice Department has expressed an interest in overturning this long-standing jurispru-
dence and has advocated for an absolute right of individual citizens to own and carry
firearms, the Supreme Court has not changed its consistent position. See Linda Greenhouse,
U.S., in a Ship, Tells Justices Citizens Have a Right to Guns, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, at Al (dis-
cussing briefs filed by Government in Supreme Court cases which advocated broader
interpretation of Second Amendment right). For an overview of the debate on the interpre-
tation of the Second Amendment, see Steven H. Gunn, A Lawyers Guide to the Second
Amendment, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 35.
250. S.659, § 2(a)(3).
251. See supra notes 87-120 and accompanying text.
252. S. 659, § 2(a) (5).
253. See, e.g., NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 495-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2003);
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), appeal granted,
788 N.E.2d 727 (Ill. 2003).
FALL 2004]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
common law."254 As discussed above, public nuisance law is
grounded in centuries-old doctrine, and the practices of certain
members of the gun industry fit well within the doctrine's prohibi-
tion of unreasonable interferences with the public health, safety,
and welfare. Moreover, public nuisance claims do not strictly con-
stitute "liability actions," a term properly descriptive of ordinary
tort actions for damages. Gun defendants have been free to make
their arguments in court that public nuisance should not apply to
them, but their arguments belong just there-in court. They do
not belong in the findings section of a proposed federal act. Nor is
it appropriate or fair to characterize, as the legislation expressly
did, judges or juries that conclude liability is proper as "maverick
judicial officer[s] or petit jur[ies] ." 5 This is simply opinion, un-
supported by the case law and out of place in federal legislation.
Also troubling was the "finding" that lawsuits against the gun in-
dustry improperly burden interstate commerce. Courts have
considered this argument 256 and rejected it. For example, in City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the Ohio Supreme Court quickly
disposed of the defendants' Commerce Clause argument finding it
untenable under existing United States Supreme Court Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.257
The legislation would have provided that "[a] qualified civil li-
ability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court"
and also would have required the dismissal of any such actions
pending at the time of enactment. The bill defined a "qualified
civil liability action" as "a civil action brought by any person against
254. S. 659,§ 2(a)(6).
255. Id.
256. In Ileto v. Glock Inc., the defendants had argued that the plaintiffs' broad complaint
indicated that the lawsuit was intended to regulate the defendants' lawful activities con-
ducted nationwide. 349 F.3d 1191, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2003).
257. 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1150 (Ohio 2002). Examining the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in BMW of N. America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the case relied upon by the
defendants, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished the claims against the gun industry. In
BMW the Supreme Court held, among other things, that a punitive damages judgment
imposed in Alabama for claims that arose outside the state to persons who were not Ala-
bama residents constituted a violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 572. The Ohio
Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court was concerned that the punitive dam-
ages award was targeted toward altering the defendant's conduct outside Alabama, when
that conduct was not necessarily unlawful outside the state. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1150 (Ohio 2002). In contrast, the Ohio case presented a
situation in which the harm alleged was suffered by the citizens of Cincinnati. Id. Moreover,
that multiple lawsuits have been brought against members of the gun industry in different
jurisdictions does not minimize this point. Rather, it emphasizes that legal redress has been
sought in the specific locales where the defendants' conduct is alleged to have caused the
specific harm.
258. S. 659, § 3.
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a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade associa-
tion, for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse
of a qualified product by the person or a third party., 259 A "quali-
fied product" included firearms (including antique firearms),
ammunition, and component parts thereof that have been placed
260in the stream of interstate or foreign commerce. Several exemp-
tions were set forth in the bill including, among other things,
negligent entrustment or negligence per se actions against a
seller (but not a manufacturer), an action based on a design or
manufacturing defect when the product is used as intended, and
actions in which a manufacturer or seller "knowingly and willfully
violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or market-
ing of the product."
263
This bill was part of a broader set of initiatives backed by busi-
ness to limit or eliminate certain civil actions, which have included
264 265 266
medical malpractice, asbestos, and class actions. But the
other bills, involving other categories of litigation, arose in re-
sponse to many years of litigation that proved problematic in the
courts and, in at least some cases, in the insurance system. For ex-
ample, thousands of asbestos lawsuits have clogged the system, and
many companies have been forced to seek the protection of the
267bankruptcy laws, while their insurers have disputed coverage.
Significantly, none of the proposed asbestos bills has come to frui-
tion despite the problems that this area of civil liability faces. In
contrast, suits against the gun industry have not proved to be prob-
lematic for the civil justice system or for the industry. Regardless of
the vocal complaints from industry quarters and their supporters,
there is no indication that gun manufacturers will suffer unfairly as
a result of lawsuits that may or may not ultimately be successful in
259. Id. § 4(5)(A).
260. Id. § 4(4).
261. Id. § 4(5) (A) (ii).
262. Id. § 4(5)(A)(v).
263. Id. § 4(5) (A) (iii).
264. Ceci Connolly, Cheney Urges Cap on Malpractice Awards, Wash. Post, July 20, 2004, at
A6.
265. Kristina Herrndobler, Senate Blocks Trust Fund for Asbestos Victims, CH-. TRIB., Apr.
23, 2004, at C13. For a discussion of the need for federal asbestos litigation by a representa-
tive of a manufacturers' trade association, see Jan Amundson, How a Congressional Answer to
Asbestos Litigation Would Help Litigants, Courts, and the American Economy, 44 S. TEx. L. REV.
925 (2003).
266. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004) (including pro-
visions to shift most class-action lawsuits to federal court).
267. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597-99 (1997).
FALL 2004)
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform
268
the courts. At the federal level, at least, this kind of protective
269
measure for a specific industry is unprecedented.
Supporters of the failed federal legislation are likely to
reintroduce a similar bill in the future. 0 As noted earlier, the bill's
defeat in the Senate was largely because several amendments were
tacked onto it in the few days prior to its demise-not because




Many states have enacted legislation to bar suits against the gun1272
industry. Some of this legislation has reached broadly, while
other acts have directly targeted certain kinds of suits against gun
manufacturers and distributors. A typical version of this latter type
of statute is exemplified by the Montana immunity statute:
The governmental right to bring suit against a firearms or
ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for
abatement, injunctive relief, or tort damages resulting from
268. To the extent that a particular manufacturer, distributor, or retailer may be held
liable for the creation of a public nuisance, or under any other applicable theory, that entity
may indeed experience financial loss. But this "suffering" is consistent with principles of
civil liability that demand recourse for those injured by culpable conduct. In the unlikely
event that a particular manufacturer were driven out of business by litigation, that outcome
would not be unjust, but the result of injuries and death that its conduct caused.
269. A limited number of federal displacements of tort law do exist, but all of these are
compensation initiatives that represent a trade-off of some kind. For a detailed discussion of
some of these initiatives, particularly the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, see Cul-
hane, Two Kinds of Justice, supra note 68, at 1058-61, 1084-87, 1091-1102. Such measures
reflect a compromise that pays injured parties, but at a lower level than they might have
received if successful in a tort suit. By contrast, the gun immunity bill would have conferred
no offsetting benefit to those injured by gun violence, even if they could prove conduct that
would ordinarily be compensable under tort law.
270. In the 2004 fight over the Senate Bill, Senators on both sides were clearly estab-
lishing their constituent base with their voting record. Many of the Senators who initially
voted in favor of the bill intended to load it with gun-control amendments before the final
vote. Many of the Senators who voted in favor of the amendments had no intention of ap-
proving a bill containing them. For example, Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota voted
with the majority of 75 to allow the debate over the bill to go forward, but backed the
amendments that were sure to lead to defeat of the measure. Sheryl G. Stolberg, Senate Bill
To Block Gun Lawsuits Moves Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at A23.
271. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
272. The Arizona gun immunity statute contains broad language that is almost identical
to the failed Senate bill, see supra notes 245-63 and accompanying text, including the "find-
ings," but bars only suits by political subdivisions of the state. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-714
(2004).
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or relating to the design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of
firearms or ammunition sold to the public is reserved exclu-
sively to the state and may not be exercised by a local
governmental unit. The state may sue under this section on
its own behalf or on behalf of a local governmental unit, or
both.
273
Such statutes that designate the state as the sole public entity with a
right to bring suit against the gun industry assure political consis-
tency within the state. Also, with a statute like Montana's, the state
is not limited to suing on its own behalf-and, presumably, having
to make the argument that the defendants' course of conduct im-
pacted the public welfare statewide-but may sue on behalf of a
particular city.21
4
Another variation is the Utah statute, which reads:
A person who lawfully designs, manufactures, markets, adver-
tises, transports, or sells firearms or ammunition to the public
may not be sued by the state or any of its political subdivisions
for the subsequent use, whether lawfully or unlawfully, of the
firearm or ammunition, unless the suit is based on the breach
of a contract or warranty for a firearm or ammunition pur-
chased by the state or political subdivision. 75
This statute provides for broad immunity from suits brought by the
state or any municipalities or other subdivisions, but does not ap-
ply to actions brought by private citizens. 76 It does, however, strip
the state-not just its subdivisions--of a specific use of its police
power. Such an act is perhaps without precedent, and for good rea-
son. As stated earlier, the police power is one of the most basic
273. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-115 (2003).
274. Other statutes omit the provision permitting the state to bring such an action on
behalf of a municipality. For example, the Virginia statute makes clear that "[a]ny action
brought by the Commonwealth pursuant to this section shall be brought by the Attorney
General on behalf of the Commonwealth." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (2003).
275. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-64(2) (2003).
276. Immunity statutes of this sort may very well encourage courts to accommodate pri-
vate plaintiffs' claims for public nuisance. Because the state and its subdivisions are unable
to sue in public nuisance on their own accord, private plaintiffs may attempt to step into
their shoes and sue for abatement of a pubic nuisance. Of course, the private plaintiffs
would still be required to prove that they have suffered a special injury-in essence, that
they have an underlying tort action. But in the gap created by such immunity statutes,
courts may become more amenable to private plaintiffs' claims for public nuisance. This
may be particularly true when the private party is a civic group, such as the NAACP.
277. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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elements of the state's ability to protect the safety, health, and wel-
fare of its citizens. Legislation that deprives state executives of the
ability to seek abatement for serious threats to the public's health
is a uniquely bad idea and reflects irrational capitulation to the
gun lobby. A bill introduced in the Vermont Senate that would
require General Assembly approval of any lawsuit against a fire-
arms manufacturer, dealer, or importer is only a slightly better
response.
As evidenced by the Utah statute, some state statutes contain an
exception to the bar on municipal suits for direct warranty or con-
tract claims brought by a political subdivision. 79 Such provisions
primarily allow for public entities to enforce contracts for firearms
and ammunition to equip their law enforcement departments. The
availability of warranty claims goes directly to the performance of
the firearms or ammunition as intended or otherwise promised.
But such claims do not include other types of product liability
claims against the gun industry that have proved to be problematic
280in the courts.
Some state immunity statutes contain broad language specifi-
cally about product liability claims. The South Dakota statute
explicitly states that "serious injury, damage, or death as a result of
normal function does not constitute a defective condition of the
product.",1 ' The Alaska statute expressly reserves some product li-
ability claims against the gun or ammunition manufacturers or
dealers: negligent design claims, manufacturing defects, breach of
2812
contract claims, and warranty claims. Notably absent from the list
of reserved claims are strict liability claims (except manufacturing
defects) and claims for failure to warn of the hazards of the prod-
ucts. The Colorado statute provides that "[a] person or other
278. See 2003 LEXIS Bill Tracking VT S.B. 151 (introduced March 11, 2003).
279. The Nevada statute provides:
The provisions of this section do not prohibit a county, city, local government or
other political subdivision of this state ... from commencing a lawsuit against a
manufacturer or distributor of a firearm or ammunition for breach of contract or
warranty concerning a firearm or ammunition purchased by the ... political subdivi-
sion.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.107(2) (2004).
280. The Nevada statute also tracks the Montana law in limiting the right to bring pub-
lic nuisance suits to the state itself. Id. § 12.107(1). For a thorough discussion of product
liability law in relation to suits against the gun industry and a proposal, see Eggen & Cul-
hane, Gun Torts, supra note 8, at 133-210.
281. S.D. COD. LAws § 21-58-4 (2003) (providing that "[a] firearm may not be deemed
defective on the basis of its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when dis-
charged").
282. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (2003).
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public or private entity may not bring an action in tort, other than
a product liability action," against a member of the gun industry.
This statute also contains a provision permitting suits against gun
or ammunition manufacturers, importers, or dealers for violation
284
of state or federal statutes or regulations.
Other categories of claims have also been excluded by some
states. The Georgia law provides: "The General Assembly ... de-
clares that the lawful design, marketing, manufacture, or sale of
firearms or ammunition to the public is not unreasonably danger-
ous activity and does not constitute a nuisance per se., 285 This
provision applies only to suits brought by a "city, county, or urban-
county government," but does not apply to suits brought by indi-
viduals. It would seem that "nuisance per se" would leave open
the possibility of a public entity demonstrating the existence of a
public nuisance through conduct that circumvents or transgresses
the parameters of legal distribution.
C. Legislation as an End-Run Around the Judiciary
These statutes reflect two common purposes. First and foremost
is to protect an industry with national clout and a vast lobbying
network. In addition to this political goal, however, lies the
broader aim of achieving "tort reform"2 1 more generally. Initia-
tives that tie the wish list of the gun lobby to this broader agenda
have just begun to surface. A bill introduced in Virginia in early
2004, for example, illustrates this point clearly. The proposed
measure would exempt from liability not only gun manufacturers,
but tobacco companies, fast food restaurants, and other companies
selling "'inherently unsafe products"' with well-known hazards. 8
The bill also includes a section severely restricting a plaintiffs abil-
ity to bring claims against a product manufacturer that has
complied with existing state or federal regulations, provided that
283. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-504.5(1) (2003). This law should not prevent a state from
suing for public nuisance because such an action does not sound in tort.
284. Id. § 13-21-504.5(4).
285. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184(a) (2) (2002); accord TNN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1314(b)
(2003).
286. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184(2) (2002).
287. "Tort reform" is in quotations to reflect the authors' view that these statutes, while
presented as reform initiatives, are too often unjustified by principles of tort law, or by
broader principles of fairness.
288. Jo Becker, Virginia BillAims to Limit Liability Suits, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2004, at B5.
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the manufacturer was unaware of the product defect.289 This kind
of legislation is a familiar form of tort reform that has circulated in
a number of states and in Congress since the 1980s. The efforts
have achieved mixed results. Repeated efforts at federal general29
tort reform have not succeeded. State tort reform measures have
been challenged successfully in some states, leaving a rocky and
unstable landscape. 9'
So single-minded are the tort reformists that they are attempting
to reform a system that does not yet have a problem. Unlike the
asbestos litigation that has clogged the judicial system for decades
and forced numerous firms into bankruptcy, for example, gun in-
dustry litigation is in its infancy. There is no indication, at least at
this juncture, that a problem of such proportions would ever arise.
And now the groundswell in favor of immunity for gun sellers
threatens to engulf other industries, as well. The Virginia pot-
pourri of protection has already proven an appealing solution. In
an effort to find a problem to solve, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives recently voted to immunize fast food restaurants from
liability.1
92
This obsession with tort reform reflects a deeper issue-a fun-
damental distrust, in some quarters, of the judicial system. Tort law
performs an important supplemental role to existing legislation.
The argument that compliance with the existing state and federal
regulations should render manufacturers and distributors beyond
the reach of the tort system is disingenuous. Still less do such ar-
guments apply to state-initiated claims for public nuisance. The
interference with public safety and welfare can come from actions
undertaken that circumvent the incomplete statutes and regula-
tions that are in place. As Judge Calabresi has stated, "legality of an
289. Id.
290. For an example of a typical measure introduced in Congress, see Product Liability
Reform Act of 1997, S. 648 105th Cong. (1997). Tort compensation schemes have been
enacted to cover certain classes of injuries, but these reflect trade-offs in compensation
levels for greatly enhanced prospects of recovery, not the removal of all recourse for injured
parties. See Culhane, Two Kinds ofJustice, supra note 68, at 1055-61.
291. See, e.g., State ex. rel Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1073
(Ohio 1999) (holding Ohio tort reform act unconstitutional); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works,
689 N.E.2d 1057 (11. 1997) (holding unconstitutional multiple amendments to Illinois tort
reform act). But cf. Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002) (upholding provision in state
tort reform act that placed caps on non-economic and punitive damages awards).
292. See Carl Hulse, Vote in House Offers a Shield for Restaurants in Obesity Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2004, at Al ("The measure was the latest Republican-led effort to provide legal
immunity for a specific industry after efforts to impose broader limits have been blocked.").
The article goes on to describe failed efforts to immunize gun sellers, producers of gasoline
additives, and the tobacco industry.
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act does not insulate it from possible tort liability."293 Especially in a
climate of lax regulation, the judicial system may step in and pro-
vide a remedy. This is all the more important when effective
regulation of the gun industry does not appear to be forthcoming,
particularly on the federal level.
Moreover, statutes that grant immunities to particular industries
are not justified under principles of tort law. To put the matter in
simplest terms, "plaintiffs have been forced to give up rights that
seem required by... principles of corrective justice, and they gain
nothing in return."294 On occasion, courts have pierced the special-
interest pleading that drives such laws, and have held industry-
specific protections to violate state constitutional guarantees. In a
show of justice and common sense, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court said of a bill protecting health care providers: "It is simply
unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the
medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most se-
verely injured and therefore most in need of compensation."295
The same could be said of the general public, whose members are
the direct and indirect victims of gun violence.
CONCLUSION
Legal doctrine should not be frozen in ancient and unbending
forms. Tort law has long been moving towards the complete aban-
donment of the writ system because of its unfair impact on
plaintiffs with legitimate claims and its unworkability in a develop-
ing civilization. Recent developments in the law of public
nuisance reflect positively on the law's ability to adapt. Although
most of the early cases decided by courts called upon to apply the
law to claims against gun sellers resulted in defeat for the munici-
palities, recently courts have demonstrated a more sophisticated
and nuanced understanding of the special role of public nuisance,
and have permitted claims to proceed without imposing unduly
strict pleading requirements. Inasmuch as public nuisance remains
a flexible doctrine subject to abuse, however, public entities are
293. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 163 n.14 (2d Cir. 1997) (CalabresiJ:, dis-
senting).
294. Culhane, Two Kinds ofJustice, supra note 68, at 1084.
295. Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980).
296. For a succinct discussion of the writ system and its eventual abolition, see RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 75-84 (1999).
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well-advised to state their case as powerfully and specifically as pos-
sible.
The onslaught of cases against gun sellers continues to present
challenges to courts attempting to distinguish theories and to
determine which parties are competent to bring particular actions.
It is vital that the special mission of public nuisance be respected
and that private claims be supported by other theories more
properly within the realm of tort. If public entities restrict
themselves to suits for abating public nuisances, and if courts are
able to follow established principles of duty, culpability, and
causation in assessing private claims, it will be more difficult for
legislatures to justify the kind of harsh and unfairly preclusive laws
that have begun to emerge.
The gun lobby has shown again and again that it enjoys power
out of proportion to the percentage of Americans that share its
absolutist views. Thus, efforts at reasonable restrictions on guns
and those who sell them face difficulty, frustration, and-too of-
ten-failure. At a time when federal and state legislators seem
more beholden to the industry than ever, the ancient action for
abatement of the public nuisance has begun to enjoy a welcome
renaissance.
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